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TRADE OR BUSINESS WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES AS AN
INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM UNDER




Does a particular set of activities constitute the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States? This is an ongoing interpretive question
affecting foreign taxpayers, both nonresident alien individuals' and foreign
corporations.2 An affirmative answer subjects a foreign taxpayer to net
basis taxation to the extent of its "effectively connected income."3 For a
* Visiting Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law
School. S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986; J.D., Harvard University, 1989; LL.M.,
New York University, 1995. This Article makes substantial use of materials that the author prepared for
Polito, 7130 T.M. Tax Management Tax Practice Series, Foreign Persons' U.S. Activities-Effectively
Connected Income (forthcoming). The author thanks Tax Management for its permission to use that
material for this Article. The author also acknowledges, with gratitude, that his interest in this topic was
originally sparked by a comment Charles I. Kingson, Esq., made in the course of delivering a
Tillinghast Lecture. See Charles I. Kingson, Taxing the Future, 51 Tax L. Rev. 641, 655 (1996). The
author would also like to thank Professors Steven A. Dean, Valerie C. Epps, Joseph Franco, Elbert L.
Robertson, and especially Edwin T. Hood for invaluable comments they gave on a previous draft.
1. I.R.C. § 7701(b) (2008). Throughout this Article the "Code" refers to the Internal Revenue
Code and the "Service" refers to the Internal Revenue Service.
2. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)&(5) (2008).
3. I.R.C. §§ 87 1(b); 882 (2008). If a foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business within the
U.S. "at any time during the taxable year" U.S. net basis taxation applies. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.871-
l(b)(I)(ii), 1.871-8(c), 1.881-1(a) (2008). Being subject to net basis taxation also imposes a return filing
obligation, even for taxpayers with very little income subject to that taxation. I.R.C. § 6012. See infra
notes 233, 239-242 and accompanying text. There is no middle ground. That is, there is no tax
exemption based on being engaged in a trade or business within the U.S. for only part of a taxable year.
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foreign corporation, it also causes the branch profits tax to apply to its
effectively connected earnings and profits.4 A negative answer results in
flat-rate gross-basis taxation5 of most types of U.S. source income, but it
also results in no taxation at all of others, notably ordinary commercial
sales of goods.6
Thus, unless a tax treaty provides otherwise, net basis taxation applies
to a foreign individual that owns and operates a racehorse stable and brings
a single racehorse into the U.S. to participate in a single race.7 Likewise,
because professional boxer Ingemar Johansson engaged in a single prize
fight in the U.S. in each of 1960 and 1961, he was subject to U.S. net basis
taxation in both of those years.' On the other hand, Piedras Negras
Broadcasting Co.9 was not subject to U.S. net basis taxation, even though
its programming was geared toward a U.S. audience and about 95 percent
of its advertising revenue was from U.S. persons.
There is no comprehensive definition of the term "trade or business"
even in the domestic context. Nevertheless, in the domestic context one can
say that it entails profit-oriented non-investment activity that is regular,
continuous and considerable."0 It is tempting, in the transition to the
international context, to conclude that the conduct of a trade or business
within the U.S. requires that a foreign taxpayer's U.S. activities must be
regular, continuous, and considerable in and of themselves.
A number of courts have articulated the standard in this manner,1
implying that some minimum quantum of U.S. activity is a necessary
condition for a foreign taxpayer to be engaged in a trade or business within
the United States. Understandably, many commentators have taken these
statements at face value as the controlling standard. 2 Nevertheless, other
4. I.R.C. § 884 (2008). Conduct of a trade or business within the U.S. also has certain ancillary
consequences. An example is its effect on the source determination for some types of income. Id. §§
861, 862, 884(0. The primary focus of this Article, however, is the threshold question of net basis
taxation.
5. The crucial distinction between net basis taxation and gross basis taxation is that under the
former regime a taxpayer's gross income is reduced by appropriate deductions allocated and
apportioned to it, id. § 861(b), while in the latter regime no such reduction is permitted.
6. Id. §§ 871,881, 882.
7. Rev. Rul. 58-63, 1958-1 C.B. 624, amplified in Rev. Rul. 60-249, 1960-2 C.B. 264.
8. Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809, 817 (5th Cir. 1964).
9. Comm'r v. Piedras Negras Broad. Co., 127 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1942). The corporation in
question was not engaged in a trade or busness within the United States because it had no U.S. source
income at all.
10. See infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 178-223 and accompanying text, distinguishing these cases on their facts and
providing an analysis of why these assertions are not interpretively controlling.
12. See, e.g., Stephen R.A. Bates, Chris Bowers, Jeffrey P. Cowan, Tax Planning for Providers of
Cross-Border Services, 106 TAx NOTES 1411, 1419 (2005); Alice Keane Putman, Targeting the
International Telecommunications Industry for U.S. Taxation. Selected Issues Regarding the Proposed
Regulations for Sourcing International Communications Income, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 149, 169 (2003);
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authority holds that even sporadic or isolated activity in the U.S. is
sufficient to cause a foreign taxpayer to conduct a trade or business within
the United States.13  Taken at face value, the coexistence of these
variegated and seemingly contradictory authorities is problematic at best.
Some of the same commentators point to the uncertainty thus created. 4 A
standard treatise in the area observes that making the determination depend
upon examining foreign taxpayers' U.S. activities without regard to their
foreign trade or business activities presents, "[A] task straining the
imagination if the [U.S.] activities would not have been undertaken absent
the foreign business to which they are subservient."' 5
As an interpretive manner, is it possible to arrive at a principled
reconciliation of this inconsistency? This Article answers that question in
the affirmative. 6 It does so by disentangling the original inquiry into two
distinct inquiries:
" Is the foreign taxpayer engaged in a trade or business?
* Is the conduct of the trade or business "within" the United States?
In doing so it advances a series of five distinct numbered propositions that
creates an interpretive reconciliation of the various authorities addressing
this question. Thus, if a taxpayer is not engaged in a trade or business at all
anywhere in the world, it cannot conduct a trade or business within the
United States, as articulated by Proposition 1. On the other hand, under
Proposition 2, if the taxpayer's domestic activities, disregarding its foreign
activities, are sufficient in themselves to constitute a trade or business, then
the taxpayer clearly conducts a trade or business within the United States.
The more complicated situation is one in which the taxpayer does
conduct a trade or business, but its domestic activities are not sufficient on
their own to constitute a trade or business. The thesis advanced as
David R. Sicular & Emma Q. Sobol, Selected Current Effectively Connected Income Issues for
Investment Funds, 56 TAX LAW. 719, 736 (2003); Richard Crawford Pugh, Policy Issues Relating to the
US. Taxation of Foreign Persons Engaged in Business in the United States Through Agents: Some
Proposals for Reform, 1 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 1, 6 (2000); Jonathan M. Ricci, Electronic Commerce
and Non-Resident Aliens: The Internal Revenue Service Versus International Cyberspace Transactions,
6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, 49-50 (1999); Bons 1. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 66.3.2 (1997); Nancy H. Kaufman, Common Misconceptions: The
Function and Framework of "Trade or Business Within the United States, " 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 729, 782-86 (1993).
13. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Putman, supra note 12, at 170; Sicular & Sobol, supra note 12, at 736; Pugh, supra
note 12, at 6-7. One observer simply notes that, whatever the threshold is, it is "quite low." Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REv. 507, 525 (1997).
15. Bittker & Lokken, supra note 12, at 66.3.2.
16. In some areas of tax law, a normative principle that has the capacity actually to guide
interpretation is notably lacking. In such circumstances, it is necessary to rely on prescription. The
problem of return of capital conventions is a prime example. See Anthony P. Polito, The Role of
Prescription in the Interpretive Problem of Basis Determination, 53 TAX LAW. 615 (2000). Fortunately,
this is not one such area.
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Proposition 3 is that, if a taxpayer does engage in a trade or business
somewhere in the world, its U.S. activity does not itself need to be regular,
continuous, and considerable to bring it into the United States. Thus, a
separate quantitative test of U.S. activity is not necessary. On the other
hand, on qualitative grounds, certain U.S. activities do not serve to bring a
foreign trade or business into the United States. Thus, investment
activities, which are not trade or business activities at all, do not contribute
to bringing a foreign trade or business into the U.S., Proposition 4.
Likewise, neither do ancillary, clerical, and ministerial activities so
contribute, Proposition 5. In short, once the existence of a trade or
business has been established, the question of whether it has been brought
into the U.S. is qualitative, and not quantitative.
A qualitative test is necessary to explain a number of the authorities.
A quantitative test, however, is not necessary. This Article concludes that
authorities articulating a standard that contradicts Proposition 3 are better
explained on their facts as being resolved under Propositions 1, 2, 4, and 5,
but there are authorities that require Proposition 3. Thus, notwithstanding
language to the contrary, a better reconciling synthesis of the existing
authorities is to interpret them as requiring a qualitative, and not a
quantitative, analysis to decide whether a foreign trade or business has
been brought into the United States.
At the outset, it is worth being explicit about what issues this Article
does not address. First, the concept of conducting a trade or business
within the U.S. is roughly parallel to the treaty concept of carrying on
business within the U.S. through a permanent establishment. 7 In their
respective spheres of application, each is essential for the application of
U.S. net basis taxation to a foreign taxpayer. It is important to note that the
standard of trade or business within the U.S. is generally broader than the
permanent establishment concept that applies to taxpayers eligible for the
benefits of a tax treaty. Thus, for example, a nonresident alien may be
engaged in a trade or business within the U.S., but may not have a
permanent establishment. 8 While the permanent establishment question is
a pressing one for those foreign taxpayers eligible for treaty benefits, the
mission of this Article is to make sense of the governing authorities dealing
with the trade or business question under the Code. 9
17. See U.S. Model Income and Capital Tax Convention, art. 5, 1996; OECD Model Income and
Capital Tax Convention, art. 5, 1977. For independent personal services there has been the roughly
equivalent concept of the "fixed base." See U.S. Model Income and Capital Tax Convention, art. 14,
1996; OECD Model Income and Capital Tax Convention, art. 14, 1977.
18. De Amodio v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 623, 625 (3rd Cir. 1962). See Rev. Rul. 85-60, 1985-1 C.B.
187. See also Robert L. Williams, Permanent Establishments in the United States, 29 TAx LAw. 277
(1976).
19. Likewise, this Article does not address issues of customary international law or constitutional
law. See infra note 101.
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Second, this Article's mission is interpretive and not to advocate a
policy position.2 ' A number of commentators have advocated various
legislative modifications of the existing thresholds for the imposition of net
basis taxation, especially as they apply to electronic commerce. 21  A
particular concern is that the sale of goods and services directly into the
U.S. via the internet might escape taxation entirely.
However, there appears little likelihood of any of these proposals
coming to fruition in the near future. Congress has not achieved enough
agreement within itself, or with the White House, to achieve much of
anything in the way of long-lasting fundamental tax reform. It is fair to say
that there is a very good chance of this picture remaining unchanged for a
fair number of years into the future. The Treasury Department itself has
expressed a preference for dealing with changing economics via adaptation
of existing legal mechanisms.
22
So long as this description of the policy playing field remains valid,
the interpretation of the existing law is unavoidable. This Article's
contribution is to clarify the interpretation of the existing standard of
whether a foreign taxpayer has brought a foreign trade or business into the
United States. Proposition 3 implies that, under existing law, there is no
quantitative barrier under the Code to the imposition of U.S. net basis
23taxation. One hopes that this interpretive exercise, and the interpretive
methodologies it illustrates, may be of some use to taxpayers, tax
administrators, jurists, and those more generally interested in resolving
interpretive problems under the Code.
II. WHOSE ACTIVITIES?
A threshold consideration is determining which activities count in this
analysis. Clearly, a foreign taxpayer's own activities are crucial to the
analysis. Nevertheless, activities are frequently imputed to a taxpayer either
20. Compare, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 12, at 729.
21. See, e.g., Oleksandr Pastukhov, International Taxation of Income Derived from Electronic
Commerce: Current Problems and Possible Solutions, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 310 (2006); Pugh,
supra note 12; Arthur J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic
Commerce Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REv. 133 (1999); Jonathan M. Ricci, Electronic Commerce and
Non-Resident Aliens: The Internal Revenue Service Versus International Cyberspace Transactions, 6
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7 (1999); Avi-Yonah, supra note 14.
22. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, SELECTED TAX
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 17, 35 (1996), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/intemet.pdf.
23. It seems that, when viewed from the perspective of the Code, rather than income tax treaties,
the primary problem in the field of electronic commerce arises from a single reported decision. Comm'r
v Piedras Negras Broad. Co., 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942); see infra notes 126, 136-127 accompanying
text.
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from a fiscally transparent entity in which the taxpayer holds an ownership
interest or from an agent. Throughout this Article, any references to a
taxpayer's activities include activities imputed to it under these briefly
outlined principles.
Shareholding is not sufficient by itself to impute activities from a
corporation to its shareholders.2 4 A different principle, however, applies to
fiscally transparent entities. Any foreign taxpayers that are beneficiaries of
an estate or trust conducting a trade or business within the U.S. are all
treated as conducting a trade or business within the United States.
25
Likewise, any foreign taxpayers that are members of a partnership
conducting a trade or business within the U.S. are all treated as conducting
a trade or business within the United States.26 That attribution can occur
via a chain of tiered partnerships. 7
That a partner is a limited partner, rather than a general partner, does
not in any way impede the attribution of the partnership's conduct of a
trade or business within the U.S. to the limited partner.2" Characterization
of a limited partner as a passive investor, under business entity law, does
not affect the tax characterization. This principle presumably applies with
equal force to the passive equity investors-the passive "members"-of the
many "alternative" business entities, such as LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs, to
the extent that they are classified as partnerships for tax purposes.2 9
In addition to interests in fiscally transparent entities, U.S. activities of
a foreign taxpayer's agents may cause it to be treated as conducting a trade
or business within the United States.30 Activities of persons with broad
discretion to bind the foreign taxpayer are properly imputed to it.3 While
an exclusive relationship is a strong factor in favor of imputing the agent's
activity to the principal for purposes determining whether there is a trade or
24. See De Vegvar v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 1055, 1061 (1957), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 3; Estate of Banac. v.
Comm'r, 17 T.C. 748, 754 (1951).
25. I.R.C. § 875(2) (2008). The Code provision makes no distinction between grantor and
nongrantor trusts. Id. Cf De Krause v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1362 (1974).
26. I.R.C. § 875(l).
27. See Johnston v. Comm'r., 24 T.C. 920, 922 (1955); Cantrell & Cochrane, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 19
B.T.A. 16, 17(1930).
28. See Rev. Rul. 75-23, 1975-1 C.B. 29; see also Rev. Rul. 87-80, 1987-2 C.B. 292 (obsoleting
Rev. Rul. 75-23 on unrelated grounds).
29. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2008).
30. See, e.g., Steven R. Lainoff, Stephen Bates & Chris Bowers, Attributing the Activities of
Corporate Agents Under U.S. Tax Law: A Fresh Look From an Old Perspective, 38 GA. L. REv. 143,
164 (2003). A corporation in which a foreign taxpayer owns stock can be, but is not inherently, the
foreign taxpayer's agent See, e.g, Comm'r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1988); InverWorld v.
Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Lewenhaupt v. Comm'r., 20 T.C. 151, 162-63 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.
1955); Adda v. Comm'r., 10 T.C. 273, 276-78 (1948), afj'd, 171 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1948); Rev. Rul.
70-424, 1970-2 C B. 150.
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business within the United States,32 even activities of independent agents
have been imputed to foreign taxpayers.33
An important distinction is whether a relationship is a principal-agent
relationship at all, as opposed to a purchaser-seller relationship. If a
foreign taxpayer sells goods to a U.S. taxpayer for independent resale, the
U.S. purchaser is not the agent of the foreign taxpayer.34 Likewise, if a
U.S. taxpayer sells goods to a foreign taxpayer for independent resale by
the foreign taxpayer, the U.S. taxpayer is not an agent for the foreign
taxpayer. This may be the case even if the U.S. taxpayer arranges to have
the goods shipped directly to the foreign taxpayer's customers.35 An
important element of this distinction is the economic independence of the
two legs of the transactions, including that a genuine purchaser takes on the
economic risk of loss of the goods.36
III. ENGAGED IN A TRADE OR BUSINESS SOMEWHERE IN THE WORLD?
Proposition 1: A necessary condition to engage in a trade or business
within the U.S. is that the taxpayer be engaged in a trade or business
somewhere in the world.
If, considering all of the activities properly attributable to it, a foreign
taxpayer is not engaged in a trade or business at all, it certainly cannot be
engaged in a trade or business within the United States. While this might
seem self-evident in the abstract, it is an important point that needs to be
made explicit. A case might purport to address whether a trade or business
is being conducted within the U.S. but actually turn on the more
fundamental issue of whether the taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business
at all.37
32. Rev. Rul. 76-161, 1976-1 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 70-424, 1970-2 C.B. 150. See also Di Portanova
v. United States, 690 F.2d 169, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Field Service Advisory 1996 WL 33321148 (Jan 30,
1996).
33. De Amodio v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 894, 906, 909 (1960), aff'd, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962);
Handfield v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 633, 638 (1955); Investors' Mortgage Sec. Co. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C.M.
(CCH) 45 (1945); Rev. Rul. 55-617, 1955-2 C.B. 774. Cf Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm'r,
104 T.C. 535, 546-47, 556 (1995) (imputing activities from independent agents for purposes of
determining whether a taxpayer has a permanent establishment in the United States). Contra Piedras
Negras Broadcasting Co., v Comm'r 43 B.T.A. 297, 311-13 (1941), aff'd 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942);
TAM 8147001, 1979 WL 54280 (Jan. 3, 1979).
34. Estate ofCadwallader v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 214, 220 (1949).
35. British Timken, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 880, 887-88 (1949); Amalgamated Dental Co. v.
Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1009, 1014-17 (1946)
36, Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (2008); U.S. Model Treaty Technical Explanation, art. 5, 6.
37. See infra notes 192-198 and accompanying text.
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The Code uses the term "trade or business" in multiple contexts but
contains no definition of that term, and neither do Treasury regulations.
The relevant concepts have evolved judicially in the course of determining
many individual cases. Much of the analysis in those decisions seems to
proceed on the assumption that informed individuals share very definite
understandings of these concepts, even if they are not able to formulate
them in precise linguistic definitions. Symptomatic of this is the failure of
any comprehensive general purpose definition to emerge from those court
decisions.38
In reading the individual decisions, it is important to bear in mind that
the meaning of expressions referring to "trade or business" may vary
according to context. The Supreme Court has cautioned that this phrase
may have slightly, but significantly, different meanings when used in
different sections of the Code.39 On the other hand, "Despite statements
that the words 'trade or business' have many shades of meaning, and are
subject to colloquial abuses, . . . the courts, quite understandably, have not
regarded the various sections of the Code using that term as water-tight
compartments."4  The Supreme Court itself has made use of precedent
under multiple Code sections to develop an overall sense of the term.4'
A comprehensive discussion of the body of authority touching on the
meaning of that term is beyond the scope of this Article.42 Nevertheless, in
addressing the question of foreign taxpayers, it is useful to make a couple
of general observations about this classification issue. A useful way to
develop a general sense of the term is to consider classifications to which it
is held in contradistinction.43
A trade or business is not passive or sporadic. It implies regular,
continuous, and considerable business activities.
38. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987).
39. Id. at 27 n.8; Snow v. Comm'r, 416 U.S 500, 503 (1974).
40. Trent v. Comn'r, 291 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1961).
41. See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 27-31 (1987).
42 See James E. Maule, Trade or Business Expenses and For-Profit Activity Deductions (Tax
Mgmt. Portfolio No. 505-2nd, 2003) (providing an analysis of many authorities relating to classification
as a trade or business).
43. An underlying assumption of this analysis is that the activity under consideration is driven by a
profit motive. Trade or business does not include activity without a profit motive. See, e.g., Bessenyey
v. Comm'r, 379 F.2d 252, 256 (2nd Cir. 1967); Doggett v. Bumet, 65 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
Certainly an activity is not a trade or business if its primary motivation is the generation of tax
deductions; See, eg., Hagler v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 598, 624 (1986); Elliot v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 227, 237
(1985); Wheeler v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 642, 644 (1983); See also I.R.C. § 183 (2008)
(disallowing, in the case of individuals and S corporations, deductions for a non-profit motivated
activity to the extent that they exceed the gross income derived by that activity). For a more extensive
discussion of the role of profit motivation in identifying a trade or business, see Maule, supra note 42.
This Article confines itself to circumstances in which the existence of a profit motivation is not in
question.
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The meaning of the phrases "engaged in business," "carrying on
business," and doing business" . . . either separately, or connectedly,
convey the idea of progression, continuity, or sustained activity.
'Engaged in business' means occupied in business; employed in
business. 'Carrying on business' does not mean the performance of a
single-disconnected business act. It means conducting, prosecuting,
and continuing business by performing progressively all of the acts
normally incident thereto, and likewise the expression 'doing business',
when employed as descriptive of an occupation, conveys the idea of
business being done, not from time to time, but all the time.44
In the colorful expression of one judge, "The word [business],
notwithstanding disguise in spelling and pronunciation, means busyness; it
implies that one is kept more or less busy, that the activity is an
occupation." '45
It is clear that the expression is "a very comprehensive term and
embraces everything about which a person can be employed., 46 The key is
activity oriented toward the generation of income or profit. Thus, business
does not require the sale of goods or services to others.47 For example, a
full-time gambler was held to be in the trade or business of gambling.48
Another crucial distinction is between trade or business on the one
hand and investment on the other hand.49  Profit oriented activity is
necessary to the existence of a trade or business. Nevertheless, it is not
sufficient, because, in a qualitative sense, investment activities do not
amount to a trade or business. In a purely domestic context, the Supreme
Court concluded that the managing of investments for one's own account is
not a business, regardless of the quantity of time or activity it entails and
the value of the investment portfolio.5" In this sense, the holding and
managing of a portfolio of securities and other investments is seen in
contradistinction to a quintessential business.
Treasury regulations provide a valuable example of this principle.
44. Lewellyn v. Pittsburgh, B&L.E.R. Co., 222 F. 177, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1915); see also Inverworld
v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231 (1996).
45. Snell v. Comm'r, 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1938) (emphasis added).
46. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911). See also Trent v. Comm'r, 291 F.2d 669,
671 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The words which Congress has long used to mark off... [a] 'trade or
business,'-. . . includes all means of gaining a livelihood by work, even those which would scarcely be
so characterized in common speech .... ").
47. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27-32 (1987).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404, 407 (1932); Bumet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 413-14
(1932); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940); Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 213-18
(1941), superseded by statute, I.R.C. § 212(1) (2008), as recognized in Estate of Rockefeller v.
Comm'r, 762 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1985); Putnam v. Comm'r, 352 U.S. 82, 87 (1956); United States
v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44-45 (1963); Whipple v. Comm'r, 373 U.S. 193, 197 (1963).
50. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217-18 (1941). Compare I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (B)(ii) (2008).
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Assume a foreign holding corporation that owns all of the voting shares in
five operating subsidiaries, two of which are U.S. corporations. The
foreign corporation does nothing other than shepherd its interests in the
operating subsidiaries. Its chief executive officer is also the chief executive
officer of one of the U.S. operating companies. The foreign corporation
has an office in Cleveland, where the officer spends a substantial part of the
year supervising the foreign corporation's interests in its subsidiaries and
where he also performs his function as the executive officer of the U.S.
company. Although the U.S. subsidiaries are subject to U.S. taxation, the
foreign parent corporation is not engaged in a trade or business within the
United States. 1
If, considering all of the foreign taxpayer's economic activities on a
worldwide basis, it is not engaged in a trade or business anywhere in the
world, then it is not engaged in a trade or business within the United States.
A taxable corporation is by its nature a profit-oriented entity, and it is a rare
corporation that is sufficiently passive to be engaged in no trade or business
at all. Nevertheless, it is possible for a corporation to be engaged solely in
investment activities and to conduct no trade or business at all. 2
Likewise, the fraction of individuals who engage in no trade or
business at all is presumably quite small. Quite notably, any personal
services performed as an employee constitute a trade or business.53
Nevertheless, if an individual's entire income is from passive investments,
that individual has no trade or business. That is true even if that
individual's self-management of an investment portfolio is a full time
occupation. 4
Regardless of how common or rare this conclusion is, its implications
are clear. If a foreign taxpayer does not engage in a trade or business
anywhere in world, it cannot be engaged in a trade or business within the
United States.55
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-3(b), Ex. (2) (2008).
52. See, e.g., McCoach v. Minehill & Schuylkill Haven R.R..Co., 228 U.S. 295, 303 (1913)
(concluding that a corporation that leased its entire business operation to another corporation was not
engaged in a trade or business); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-3(b), Ex. (2). But see Edwards v. Chile Copper Co.,
270 U.S. 452, 455 (1926) (holding that a corporation organized solely to hold the stock of a subsidiary
and provide financing to the subsidiary via the issuance of parent bonds was engaged in a trade or
business); Rev. Rul. 78-195, 1978-1 C.B. 39 (allowing I.R.C. § 162 trade or business expense
deductions to a corporation that was formed for the express purpose of investing in real property and
that engaged in no commercial activity except to purchase a tract of unimproved, non-income-
producing real property, which it held for two years and sold without having made any substantial
improvements).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(a) (2008).
54 Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218.
55. See, e.g, Cont'l Trading, Inc v. Comm'r, 16 TC.M. (CCH) 724 (1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d 40
(9th Cir. 1959).
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IV. U.S. ACTIVITIES INDEPENDENTLY A TRADE OR BUSINESS
Proposition 2: A sufficient condition to engage in a trade or business
within the U.S. is that, disregarding the foreign taxpayer's foreign
activities, its U.S. activities constitute the conduct of a trade or business.
A foreign taxpayer's profit oriented non-investment U.S. activities
may be sufficiently regular, continuous, and considerable to constitute the
conduct of a trade or business entirely on their own. In that case, there is
no doubt that the foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business within
the United States.56 In such a circumstance, an analysis of the foreign
taxpayer's foreign business activities is superfluous.
A good illustration of this principle is the application in InverWorld,
Inc. v. Commissioner7 of the Treasury's limited-applicability definition of
whether an alien individual or a foreign corporation is engaged in the active
conduct of a banking, financing or similar business within the United
States.58 Under the regulation, a nonresident alien individual or a foreign
corporation is considered to be engaged in the active conduct of a banking,
financing, or similar business within the U.S. if.59
* At some time during the taxable year the taxpayer is engaged in
business within the U.S.; and
" The activities of the business consist of any one or more of several
specified types of activities carried on, in whole or in part, within
the U.S. in transactions with persons situated either inside or
outside the United States.
The specified types of U.S. activities that can result in the active conduct of
a banking, financing, or similar business are any of the following:
* Receiving deposits of funds from the public;
60
* Making personal, mortgage, industrial, or other loans to the
public;
6 1
* Purchasing, selling, discounting, or negotiating any of notes,
drafts, checks, bills of exchange, acceptances, or other evidences of
56. See, e.g., Pinchot v. Comm'r, 113 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1940); Lewenhaupt v. Comm'r, 20
T.C. 151, 163 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298,
304 (2d Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 55-617, 1955-2 C.B. 774.
57. 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, 3237-18 to 3237-19 (1996).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 1.864(c)(5)(i)(a).
61. Id. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i)(b).
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indebtedness for the public on a regular basis;
62
* Issuing letters of credit to the public and negotiating drafts drawn
under them;
6 3
* Providing trust services for the public;64 or
* Financing foreign exchange transactions for the public.
65
On its face, the regulation invites certain objections to this line of
reasoning. The application of the regulation requires a predicate
determination that the taxpayer is engaged in a business within the United
States.66 Furthermore, this definition exists in the context of determining
whether income is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States. Strictly speaking the definition relates
only to the resolution of the whether income is "effectively connected"
67
and not to whether there is a trade or business or whether it is within the
United States.
Nevertheless, at a conceptual level, it does provide some assistance in
resolving the question of whether there is a trade or business within the
United States. 68  The Tax Court found that InverWorld, Ltd., engaged in
five of the six listed activities on a regular basis. It found this a convincing
argument that its U.S. activities were sufficient in themselves to constitute
a trade or business. 69 In addition, while dealing with public customers or
clients is not a necessary condition to the existence of a trade or business,7"
regular provision of these banking services to the public negates the
proposition that the taxpayer's activities are for investment 71 rather than for
trade or business. 72 In short, InverWorld's profit oriented non-investment
U.S. activities were sufficiently regular, continuous, and considerable to
62. Id. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i)(c).
63. Id. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i)(d).
64. Id. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i)(e).
65. Id § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i)(f).
66. Id. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(i).
67. Id. § 1.864-4(c)(ii). See also I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(B)(ii)(c) (2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-5 (a).
68. InverWorld, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, 3237-18 to 3237-19 (1996).
69. Id. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. For this Article, InverWorld is pertinent for its
methodology of finding the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. The Article has no
stake in the argument as to whether the InverWorld court accurately applied the regulatory text to the
facts of the case. See, e.g., Yaron Z. Reich, Taxing Investors' Portfolio Investments: Developments and
Discontinuities, 79 TAx NOTES 1465, 1473-74 (1998).
70 Comm'rv. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 28-32 (1987).
71. See, e.g, Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404, 407 (1932); Bumet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 413-14
(1932); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940); Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 213-18
(1941), superseded by statute, I.R.C § 212(1) (2008), as recognized in Estate of Rockefeller v.
Comm'r, 762 F 2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1985); Putnam v. Comm'r, 352 U.S. 82, 87 (1956); United States
v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44-45 (1963); Whipple v Comm'r, 373 U.S. 193, 197 (1963).
72. InverWorld, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3237-19 to 3237-26 (holding the non-applicability of the
I.R.C. § 864(b)(2) exclusions of investment-related trading from the determination of whether a
taxpayer engages in a trade or business within the U.S.). See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying
text.
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constitute the conduct of a trade or business entirely on their own.
V. FOREIGN TRADE OR BUSINESS BROUGHT INTO THE UNITED STATES
Proposition 3: A foreign taxpayer's U.S. activities, in isolation from
its foreign activities, need not constitute the conduct of a trade or business
in order to cause a foreign trade or business to be conducted within the
United States.
The more complicated situation relates to a foreign taxpayer that does
engage in some trade or business, but the U.S. activities of which are not
quantitatively sufficient in themselves to constitute a trade or business. An
argument can be made on policy grounds that the standard for finding a
trade or business within the U.S. should set a minimum condition that the
taxpayer's U.S. activities be sufficiently regular, continuous, and
considerable to themselves constitute the conduct of a trade or business.7 3
Nevertheless, purely as an interpretive matter, this Article rejects explicitly
any assertion that a necessary condition for bringing a foreign trade or
business into the U.S. is that a foreign taxpayer's U.S. activities must, in
isolation from its foreign activities, themselves constitute the conduct of a
trade or business. Instead, it concludes that the pertinent authorities are
better read as standing for the proposition that no minimum quantum of
U.S. activity is necessary to bring a foreign trade or business into the
United States.
The Code contains specific categories of activities that are to be
treated as either the conduct of a trade or business within the U.S. or not the
conduct of a trade or business within the U.S., but it contains little direct
guidance as to whether a foreign taxpayer's trade or business can be
brought within the US. even though its U.S. activities do not themselves
constitute a trade or business within the United States. Treasury
regulations indicate, in a statement that is virtually impossible to contradict
but that provides virtually no guidance, that whether a person is engaged in
a trade or business within the U.S. is determined on the basis of the facts
and circumstances in each case.74 As a consequence, the Service will not
ordinarily issue rulings on whether a foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade
or business within the United States.75
73. See, e.g., Kaufnan, supra note 12, at 782-86 (advocating such a standard should be adopted as
a matter of sound policy).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(e) (2008). See also Rev. Rul. 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 268.
75. See Rev. Proc. 2007-7, 2007-1 I.R.B. 227. The list of areas in which the Service will not issue
rulings is renewed annually in a revenue procedure published in the first Internal Revenue Bulletin of
the year.
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The one piece of general guidance the Code does provide is related to
personal services. As a general rule, with very limited exceptions, the
performance of any personal services within the U.S. constitutes the
conduct of a trade or business within the United States.76 Therefore, a
foreign taxpayer's U.S. personal service activities do not need to be
regular, continuous, or considerable to constitute a trade or business within
the United States.77
Thus, for example, a single ten-week period of U.S. performances at a
single hotel by a foreign revue constituted the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States.78 A foreign professional golfer that
participated in a small number of tournaments in the U.S. was engaged in a
trade or business within the United States.7 9 A foreign professional boxer,
Ingemar Johansson, participated in a small number of professional boxing
matches in the United States. In particular, his entire economic connection
to the U.S. for 1960 and 1961 was a single prizefight in each year. ° A
single economic transaction in each of 1960 and 1961 was sufficient to
conclude that Johansson was engaged in a trade or business within the U.S.
during each of those years."
One might be tempted to assert that this principle applies only to
personal services and does not apply to other types of economic
connections to the United States. On the other hand, the principle has been
extended beyond personal services. A foreign individual that owned and
operated a racehorse stable brought a single racehorse into the U.S. to
participate in a single race. The Service concluded that participation in that
one race was sufficient to constitute the conduct within the U.S. of a trade
or business.5 2 The compensation from the horse's participation in the race
76 I.R.C. § 864(b) (2008). Note that this is not in any way limited to employee services. There are
very specific statutory exceptions to the general rule that apply in very limited situations. For a
discussion of why these exceptions do not negate the thesis advanced by this Article, see infra notes
129-139 and accompanying text.
77. See Charles I. Kingson, Taxing the Future, 51 Tax L. Rev. 641, 655 (1996) (arguing that
focusing on the amount of time that services are performed in a particular place "confuses the question
of whether a person is doing business at all with whether he is doing business in a particular
jurisdiction").
78. Rev Rul. 67-321, 1967-2 C.B. 470.
79. Rev. Rul. 70-543, 1970-2 C.B. 172, amplified by Rev. Rul. 73-107, 1973-1 C.B. 376.
80 United States v. Johansson, 8 AFTR 2d 6001 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
81. Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809, 813 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Rev Rul. 70-543,
1970-2 C.B. 172, amplified by Rev. Rul. 73-107, 1973-1 C.B. 376. Another important point to bear in
mind is the interaction of two separate principles. One is the general rule that any personal services
performed within the U.S. constitutes the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. The
other is the imputation of agents' activities to their principals. The result is that services performed
within the U.S. by a foreign individual may result in both the individual and the individual's foreign
pnncipal conducting a trade or business within the United States. Both of them would be subject to U.S.
net basis taxation. See Rev. Rul. 74-330, 1974-2 C.B. 278; Rev. Rul. 74-331, 1974-2 C.B. 281.
82. Rev. Rul. 58-63, 1958-1 C.B. 624, amplified in Rev. Rul. 60-249, 1960-2 C.B. 264. See also
Rev. Rul. 70-543, 1970-2 CB. 172 (concluding that income may be exempt from payor withholding if
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was not for personal services, and it is immaterial whether the owner raced
the horse himself or engaged a jockey for that purpose.83 Given that even a
single economic transaction involving very minor personal services is
sufficient to bring a foreign trade or business into the U.S. to the extent of
that one transaction, there does not appear to be any particularly good
conceptual reason to conclude that either sales of goods or use of property
for compensation must be substantial to have the same effect.84
In this regard, it is useful to contrast the limitation imposed by U.S.
income tax treaties on the taxation of business profits. Under a typical
bilateral income tax treaty, a foreign taxpayer's U.S. business profits are
taxable only to the extent attributable to a permanent establishment.85 A
permanent establishment means a fixed place of business.86 Among the
specifically included examples are:87
" A place of management;
" A branch;
* An office;
* A factory; and
" A workshop.
In contrast, the Code contains no such minimum threshold connection to
the U.S. to invoke net basis taxation. 88 It is true that, for six years, from
193689 through 1941, 9' the U.S. imposed net basis taxation on a foreign
the foreign taxpayer provides the appropriate certification that the income is being treated as income
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the U.S.), amplified by Rev. Rul.
73-107, 1973-1 C.B. 376.
83. Rev. Rul. 70-543, 1970-2 C.B. 172, amplified by Rev. Rul. 73-107, 1973-1 C.B.
84. One might conceivably assert that, in these cases of minimal U.S. activity, the U.S. activity is
sufficient in and of itself to be regular, continuous, and considerable, even viewed in isolation of any
foreign activity. Such a reading would appear to strip that expression of all substantive meaning. If
that proposition were true for such de minimis U.S. activity, one would be forced to conclude that there
is no minimum quantum threshold to be engaged in a trade or business at all. Nevertheless, from that
unlikely proposition would follow a fortion that there is no minimum quantum threshold to bring a
foreign trade or business into the United States.
85 See U.S Model Income Tax Convention, art. 7, 1, 2006; OECD Model Income Tax
Convention, art. 7, 1, 1997.
86. See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art, 5, 1; OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art.
5, 11. For independent personal services there has been the roughly equivalent concept of the "fixed
base." See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 14; OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 14.
87. See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 5, 2; OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art.
5, 2. A permanent establishment also includes the activities of a U.S. dependent agent that has, and
habitually exercises, the authority to conclude contracts that are binding on the foreign taxpayer. See
U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 5, 5; OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 5, 5.
88. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882 (2008). Net basis taxation is limited to the amount of income that is
effectively connected to the conduct of a U.S. trade or business, see I.R.C. § 864(c), but that concept
limits the amount subject to net basis taxation not the applicability of net basis taxation. Nevertheless,
the "effectively connected" concept serves as an important counterbalance to the harshness of imposing
net basis taxation without a minimum quantitative threshold. See infra notes 102-110 and
accompanying text.
89. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. 74-740, ch. 690, §§ 211, 231, 49 Stat. 1648, 1714-15, 1717
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taxpayer that either conducted a trade or business within the U.S. or had a
U.S. office or place of business. There has never been a time, however,
during which the Code has foreclosed net basis taxation in the absence of a
U.S. office or place of business.
The American Law Institute proposed that the U.S. abandon the "trade
or business within the U.S." standard for a "fixed place of business"
standard.9 Nevertheless, the U.S. has not adopted a "fixed place of
business" standard as the threshold for the imposition of net basis
taxation.92 The "trade or business within the U.S." standard remains
broader than the permanent establishment concept. Thus, a nonresident
alien may be engaged in a trade or business within the U.S., even though its
U.S. connections do not amount to a permanent establishment.93
Given the rejection of the opportunity to articulate the threshold as a
"fixed place of business" standard, and that isolated economic transactions
are sufficient to bring a foreign trade or business into the United States,
there is no clear, or even discernable, point in existing law pegging a
quantitatively minimum standard for bringing a foreign trade or business
into the United States. In the absence of such a quantitative pegging point,
the authorities under the Code are more reasonably read as indicating that
even minor amounts of U.S. activity in the course of what otherwise
constitutes the conduct of a foreign trade or business are sufficient to bring
it into the United States. Thus, the question of whether activity is regular,
continuous, and considerable relates to whether the activity is a trade or
business at all. If that threshold is satisfied, there is a trade or business,
even if it is conducted overwhelmingly abroad. Once the existence of a
trade or business is established, even a minor amount of activity within the
U.S. should be sufficient in principle to bring the trade or business into the
United States to the extent of that activity. T hat is, an admitted trade or
business is conducted within the U.S. to whatever extent and for whatever
portion of a taxable year, great or small, the activity of that trade or
business occurs in the United States.94
(1935-36). See also Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §§ 211, 231. For the text of these provisions, see
Pub. L. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1, 75-76, 78 (1939).
90. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-753, ch. 619, § 160(d), 56 Stat. 798, 861 (1942). See also
Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-753, ch. 619, § 101, 56 Stat. 798, 802 (1942) (setting effective date).
91. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
UNITED STATES TAXATION 90-93 (1987).
92. The U.S. uses the "office or other fixed place of business" standard only in the limited
circumstances to determine source of income for sale of goods, I.R.C. § 865(e), and whether certain
limited classes of income are treated as effectively connected income, id. § 864(c)(4); Treas. Reg. §
1.864-4(c)(5)(ii) (2008). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7 (defining "office or other fixed place of
business").
93. De Amodio v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 894, 906, 909 (1960), aff'd 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); Rev.
Rul. 85-60, 1985-1 C.B. 187. See also Williams, supra note 18.
94. In this regard, it is worth noting that a foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business within
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One might object to this interpretation because it catches foreign
taxpayers with low levels of U.S. business activity. For example, under
this interpretation, a foreign taxpayer engaged a foreign trade or business
conducts it within the U.S. to the extent that it engages in a single sales
transaction within the United States. What is the result under the Code95 of
the seeming harshness this of this result? First, in most circumstances
other, qualitative, grounds would prevent this type of limited connection
from constituting the conduct within the U.S. of a trade or business.9 6
Second, an exceedingly small modicum of advance tax planning suffices to
ensure that an isolated sale of goods into the U.S. generates foreign source
income that is not subject to U.S. taxation at all.97 Third, even in many
cases in which the correct interpretation of the statute requires the
imposition of U.S. taxation, very low levels of U.S. income may simply
"fly below the radar screen" and go untaxed simply because they are
unnoticed. Fourth, in many such cases, it may well be that the I.R.S.
exercises its discretion to conclude that the amount of revenue at stake is
not worth the cost of enforcement.98
The cost of administration may well cause the I.R.S. simply to ignore
the unpaid tax in such cases. That, however, is a matter of wise husbanding
of scarce administrative resources, of administrative grace to taxpayers, or
of both. It is not a function of the interpretation of the Code. Any such
administrative disregard of minor business dealings in the U.S. does not
imply that those taxpayers are not engaged in trade or business within the
United States.
If a foreign trade or business enters the U.S. for one transaction, then
it is engaged in a trade or business within the U.S., but only to the extent of
that one transaction. Admittedly, this reading of the law presents a very
the U.S. if it is so engaged "at any time during the taxable year .. " Treas. Reg. §§ 1.871-1(b)(1)(ii),
1.871-8(c), 1.881-1(a).
95. This analysis assumes the absence of an applicable income tax treaty that might override this
conclusion, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text, in order to maintain its focus on the
interpretive problem under the Code.
96, Concluding sales from entirely outside the U.S, without the involvement of any U.S. office or
agent, should serve this function in most circumstances. See Comm'r v. Piedras Negras Broad. Co., 127
F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1942). More generally, see infra notes 122-142 and accompanying text.
97, Arranging for the sale to be concluded-for title and risk of loss to pass to the purchaser-
while the goods are outside of the U.S. suffices make the income foreign source not subject to U.S.
taxation, so long as the foreign taxpayer does not maintain an office or fixed place of business in the
United States. I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 865(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c). Of course, if a foreign
taxpayer makes a sale of goods attributable to its U.S. office or fixed place of business, it may generate
U.S. source income. I.R.C. § 865(e)(2). On the other hand, such a taxpayer has no legitimate objection
to the conclusion that it is conducting a trade or business within the United States.
98. See infra notes 193-195 and accompanying text. These four explanations may also go a long
way toward explaining the dearth of pertinent reported cases involving low volumes of sales of goods
within the United States. An additional possible explanation is that the tax involved in such
circumstances is sufficiently minor that taxpayers do not challenge the I.R.S. when it assesses the tax.
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low threshold for bringing a foreign trade or business into the U.S., and
thereby subjecting it to U.S. net basis taxation99 and, in the case of
corporations, the branch profits tax."°0 However, the last proviso is the
critical qualification. The imposition of the tax under the Code is
measured, and limited, by the extent to which the foreign trade or business
is brought into the United States.'
VI. EFFECTIVELY CONNECTED CONCEPT AS LIMITING COUNTERBALANCE
The "effectively connected" concept"' significantly mitigates the
seeming harshness of Proposition 3. Net basis taxation applies only to
income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States.0 3 The branch profits tax applies only to
effectively connected earnings and profits." T hus, the effectively
connected concept serves as an important counterbalance to the broad
definition of conducting a trade or business within the United States,
because it controls the extent of U.S. taxation.
There is one point at which this counterbalancing appears superficially
to break down; U.S. source non-capital gain income sales. This income is
99. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882.
100. Id. § 884.
101. One might argue that taxing a foreign person to the extent of its limited conduct of its trade or
business within the U.S. violates either the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment or customary international law. Strictly speaking, these points are not relevant to this
Article, the mission of which is to interpret the language of the Code. Nonetheless, they appear to be
issues worthy of further examination. As a preliminary mater, viewed on their merits, they stnke the
author as dubious. In the international context, the Constitution has been interpreted to impose very
little limitation on the federal government's taxing authority, and the Supreme Court has not seen fit to
revisit it jurisprudence in this area. See Bumet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 401-05 (1933); Cook v. Tait,
265 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1924). Even if one were to import Fourteenth Amendment due process concepts
into this area, the constitutional argument remains highly contestable. If a foreign person purposefully
avails itself of the benefits of the U.S. economic market for even a single transaction, then it is
reasonable for the U.S. to tax that one transaction. Cf Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307
(1992); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985). The purposeful availment
analysis seems reasonable in terms of the customary international law argument as well. Cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 41 l(2)(b), 412(4)
(1987). Moreover, notable tax law scholars have doubted the notion that there even is any customary
international law with respect to taxing jurisdiction. See, e.g., Martin Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and
International Income, 17 TAx L. REV. 431, 438 (1962); Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the
Taxation of Foreign Corporate Investment, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 817 (1956); Harold Wurzel,
Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation, 38 COLUM. L REV. 809 (1938). In any case, it is
clear that the Supremacy Clause requires U.S. courts to enforce the Code in preference to any such
customary international law, until and unless Congress amends the former. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.
102. I.R.C. § 864(c).
103. Id. §§ 871(b), 882.
104. Id. § 884(b), (d), (f).
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swept into effectively connected status via the "limited" or "residual" force
of attraction principle.' °5 Thus, if a foreign taxpayer is considered to
conduct a trade or business within the U.S., any U.S. source income from
the sale of goods is effectively connected.
Here a valuable illustration from the Treasury is worth noting. A
foreign corporation, which uses the calendar year as the taxable year, is
engaged in the business of purchasing and selling electronic equipment.
The home office of the foreign corporation also is engaged in the business
of purchasing and selling vintage wines. During 2007, the foreign
corporation establishes a branch office within the U.S. to sell electronic
equipment to customers, some of whom are located within the U.S. and the
balance in foreign countries. This branch office is not equipped to sell, and
does not participate in sales of, wine purchased by the home office.
Negotiations for the sales of the electronic equipment take place in the U.S.
By reason of the activity of its branch office in the U.S., the foreign
corporation is engaged in business within the U.S. during 2007. As a result
of advertisements that the home office of the foreign corporation places in
periodicals sold in the U.S., customers in the U.S. frequently place orders
for the purchase of wines with the home office in the foreign country, and
the home office makes sales of wine in 2007 directly to those customers
without routing the transactions through its branch office in the United
States. The income or loss from sources within the U.S. for 2007 from
sales of electronic equipment by the branch office, together with the
income or loss from sources within the U.S. for that year from sales of
wine by the home office, is treated as effectively connected for that year
with the conduct of a business within the U.S. by the foreign corporation." 6
Nevertheless, even here the failure to control the extent of U.S.
taxation is more superficial than real. The impact of this limited force of
attraction can be significantly mitigated by placing the U.S. branch in a
legally distinct corporation from the foreign business making direct sales
into the U.S., and by ensuring that the former is not an agent of the latter.
117
If the electronic equipment business in the example were isolated in this
way from the wine marketing business, the latter's sales would not be
swept into the former's effectively connected income.'0 8 The wine business
would most likely not be considered the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States.'0 9
Thus, the effectively connected concept does significantly mitigate the
105. Id. § 864(c)(3).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b), Ex. (3) (2008).
107. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
108. 1.R.C. § 864(c).
109. See infra notes 122-142 and accompanying text. The ease with which sales of goods income
can be "resourced" as foreign, further mitigates the effect. See supra note 97.
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effect of a low-threshold interpretation of what is necessary to bring a
foreign trade or business into the United States.' In short, the inquiry into
whether a foreign taxpayer engages in a trade or business within the U.S.
determines only the possibility of U.S. net basis taxation and branch profits
taxation. It is the effectively connected concept that determines the extent
of that U.S. taxation.
VII. QUALITATIVE EXCLUSIONS FROM THE U.S.
Nevertheless, if Proposition 3 is to be useful in practice, it is still
necessary to deal with the authorities that conclude that some U.S.
activities do not amount to the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States. Even in the absence of a minimum quantum of activity
necessary to be engaged in a trade or business within the U.S., it is not the
case that any connection to the U.S. is sufficient to bring a foreign trade or
business into the United States. Some types of activity are qualitatively
insufficient to bring a foreign trade or business within the U.S., regardless
of how regular, considerable, and continuous they are.
A. INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES DO NOT COUNT
Proposition 4: U.S. investment activities do not contribute to bringing
a foreign trade or business into the United States.
As a first cut, investment activities are distinguished from trade or
business activities. Investment income and the management of one's own
investments, in and of themselves, are not considered a trade or business at
all."' Based on the same principle, a foreign taxpayer is not considered to
conduct a trade or business within the U.S. if its U.S. income is limited to
investment income.' 12
In Scottish American Investment Co. v. Commissioner,"3 foreign
investment corporations made extensive use of their U.S. office to collect
revenues, make remissions to the home offices, maintain records, exercise
110. For a more extensive discussion of effectively connected concepts, see 2 Philip F. Postlewaite,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL §§ 19.11 through 19.22 (3rd ed. 1998).
111. Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941), superseded by statute, I.R.C. § 212(1) (2008),
as recognized in Estate of Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1985).
112. See, e.g., Cont'l Trading, Inc. v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 40, 43-45 (9th Cir. 1959); Consolidated
Premium Iron Ores Ltd. v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 127, 147, 150 (1957); Neill v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 197,
198 (1942). Cf. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (B)(ii).
113. 12T.C.49(1949).
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voting rights, and perform ancillary accounting functions."4 None of this
amounted to the conduct of a trade or business within the United States."
5
Their real business was the cooperative management in Scotland of British
capital, a large part of which was invested by them in American securities





Consistent with this principle, certain statutorily specified U.S.
activities related to trading in stocks, securities, and commodities do not
constitute the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.
Viewed in isolation, these activities should not constitute a trade or
business. In addition, they do not serve by themselves to bring a foreign
trade or business into the United States.
In particular, trading in stocks, securities, or commodities is not a
trade or business within the U.S. if."
117
* Done through a resident broker, commission agent, custodian, or
other independent agent; and
" There is no time during the year at which the taxpayer has an office
of fixed place of business within the U.S. through which or by the
direction of which the transactions in stock, securities, or
commodities are effected.
In addition, trading in stocks, securities, or commodities for the taxpayer's
own account are not a trade or business within the U.S. regardless of."8
* Whether the trading is done by the taxpayer or his employees or
through a resident broker, commission agent, custodian, or other
agent, and
* Whether or not any such employee or agent has discretionary
authority to make decisions in effecting the transactions.
This exception for trading for one's own account, however, is not available
to dealers." 9
Consistent with the thesis of a qualitative, rather than quantitative,
standard, the volume of trading does not affect the applicability of these
exclusions from being a trade or business within the United States. 2° That
a taxpayer does not satisfy one of these rules relating to stock, securities, or
commodities for exclusion from conducting a trade or business within the
114. Id. at 56.
115. Id. at 59.
116. Id.
117. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(i), (2)(B)(i), & (C).
118. Id. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (2)(B)(ii).
119. Id. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii)&(2)(B)(ii). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(2)(iv) (2008) (defining
dealer in stock or securities).
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(1).
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U.S. does not, by itself, prove the reverse. That is, failing the exclusion test
is not enough to prove the existence of a trade or business within the
United States. That must be determined on the taxpayer's particular facts
and circumstances.
12
B. ANCILLARY, CLERICAL, AND MINISTERIAL ACTIVITIES
Proposition 5: Ancillary, clerical, and ministerial activities do no
contribute to bringing a foreign trade or business into the U.S., without
regard to their extensiveness.
Even once Proposition 4 is taken into account, a number of authorities
remain concluding that non-investment U.S. activities fail to bring a
foreign trade or business into the United States. That exclusion, however,
is not predicated on the extent of those activities. The key aspect is that
they are only tangentially related to the conduct of a trade or business.
A number of these tangential activities can be distilled and cataloged:
* Investigating business opportunities in the U.S. for purposes of
deciding whether to enter into a U.S. business generally is not
itself a trade or business within the United States.
22
* Purchasing products in the U.S. for resale abroad, without
maintaining a U.S. office, generally does not constitute a trade or
business within the United States.'
23
* Acquiring an interest in property in the U.S. from a U.S. person
already under contract to purchase that property and participating
in the proceeds of its resale abroad does not itself constitute a trade
or business within the United States. 1
24
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(e). See also Newman De Vegvar v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 2055 (1957) (no
U.S. business); Chang v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 1040, 1045 (1955) (no U.S. business); Comm'r v. Nubar,
185 F.2d 584, 588 (4th Cir. 1951) (U.S. business); Adda v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 273, 279 (1947), aff'd,
171 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1948) (U.S. business); Adda v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 1291, 1297 (1948) (U.S.
business); Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1941), superseded by statute, I.R.C. § 212(1)
(2008), as recognized in Estate of Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1985) (no U.S.
business).
122. Abegg v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 145, 153-54 (1968), acq. 1948-2 C.B. 1, aff'd, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d
Cir. 1970).
123. See British Timken, Ltd. v Comm'r, 12 T.C. 880, 885-87 (1949); European Naval Stores Co.,
S.A. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 127, 132 (1948), acq 1948-2 C.B. 2; Amalgamated Dental Co. v. Comm'r, 6
T.C. 1009, 1014 (1946). One court asserted that, "a decision that activities of this nature are sufficient
to [make a foreign taxpayer] ... engaged in trade or business within the United States would only deter
foreign business organizations from purchasing goods in the United States and from engaging the
services of banking institutions located in the United States." United States v. Balanovski, 131 F. Supp.
898, 903-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
124. Pasquel v. Comm'r, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1431 (1953). In Pasquel, the property in question was
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" Purely promotional activities, such as advertising, gathering and
dispersing information, and the use of showrooms, probably do not
constitute a trade or business within the United States.'
25
* Direct sale of products to U.S. purchasers, such as via catalogs or
the internet, without involvement of a U.S. office or agent,
marketing or direct solicitation activity in the U.S., or maintenance
of a stock of inventory in the U.S., is not a trade or business within
the United States.
126
* Clerical and ministerial activities, such as the delivery of goods,
handling of paperwork, and collection of payments in the U.S. are
not enough to amount to the conduct within the U.S. of a trade or
business. 127
Even if these U.S. activities are quantitatively substantial, they do not serve
to bring a foreign trade or business into the United States. It is worth
fleshing out the facts of a couple of the underlying authorities to
demonstrate the qualitative nature of these exclusions.
A good illustration is provided by Spermacet Whaling and Shipping
Co. v. Commissioner.2 8 Spermacet was organized under Panamanian law
to undertake a whaling expedition on behalf of Smidas Company, Inc., a
U.S. corporation that had a contract to sell the resulting oil to ADM, a U.S.
corporation.29  A U.S. officer of ADM was instrumental in organizing
Spermacet, in negotiating the acquisition of its ships and the agreements for
the sale of the oil, and he acted as its treasurer.'30  Spermacet's
organizational meeting was held in New York City, some of its books and
records were located in the U.S., and it maintained a New York bank
account from which the treasurer disbursed funds.' It had no U.S. office
as such. 132 The whaling expedition was managed, directed and operated out
two war surplus landing ships. The transaction in question had more of the indicia of a financing
arrangement rather than one of Pasquel purchasing a bona fide ownership interest in the ships in
question. Id. at 1431-32.
125. See Joseph Isenbergh, The "Trade or Business'" of Foreign Taxpayers in the United States, 61
Taxes 972, 979 (1983); 2 Philip F. Postlewaite, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CORPORATE AND
INDIVIDUAL § 18.02 (3rd ed. 1998).
126. See Comm'r v. Piedras Negras Broad. Co., 127 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1942). While a U S.
office or fixed place of business is not a necessary condition to bnng a foreign trade or business into the
U.S., the lack of one does make it easier to remain out of the United States. In Piedras Negras, the
corporation in question was not engaged in a trade or business within the United States because it had
no U.S. source income at all. Id.
127. Spermacet Whaling & Shipping Co. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 618, 633-34 (1959), aff'd, 281 F.2d
646 (6th Cir. 1960); Linen Thread Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 725, 736-37 (1950).
128. 30 T.C. at 618.
129. Id. at 622-23.
130. Id. at 619, 623, 626, 629-30
131. Id. at 622, 627-30.
132. Id. at 630.
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of Norway by Spermacet's Norwegian shareholders, and on the high seas."'
The oil was delivered to ADM in New York for the account of Smidas,
which in turn made payment to Spermacet's New York bank account.134
Spermacet was not engaged in trade or business within the United States.135
Commissioner v. Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co. 136 is a particularly
good illustration of a qualitative exclusion. Piedras Negras broadcasted
programs into the U.S. from a radio station located on the south bank of the
Rio Grande."' It solicited U.S. advertisers but executed the advertising
contracts for its programs in Mexico. 3 " It received payment and mail at an
accommodation address in Texas, but had no office in the United States. 9
About 95 percent of its advertising revenue was from U.S. persons, and
some of its funds were deposited in a U.S. bank.'4 Because its activity in
the U.S. was incidental in relation to its overall activity, which generated
no U.S. source income, Piedras Negras was not engaged in a trade or
business within the United States.
14 1
The interaction of Proposition 3 and Proposition 5 is that the analysis
of whether a foreign trade or business has been brought into the U.S. is
qualitative and not quantitative. Certain types of connections are
insufficient to bring a foreign trade or business into the United States.
Their relative regularity, continuity and considerableness do not affect this
determination. One might say that an activity does not serve to bring a
foreign trade or business in to the U.S. if it is of a "preparatory or auxiliary
character.' '142 Activity of such an ancillary nature will not bring a foreign
trade or business into the U.S., regardless of how regular, continuous and
considerable it is. On the other hand, U.S. activity that is not ancillary will
serve to bring a foreign trade or business into the U.S. even if it is sporadic,
133. Id. at 633.
134. Id. at 627, 632.
135. Id. at 633-34.
136. 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942).




141. Id at 261. The literal application of this decision implies that selling goods or services into the
U.S. via the internet is, by itself, qualitatively insufficient to bring a foreign trade or business into the
U.S., without regard to whether the quantitative measure of those sales is great or small. A number of
proposals that have been advanced with regard to the taxation of electronic commerce imply the
modification or abandonment of this qualitative standard. See supra note 21. Because of this Article's
interpretive mission, the policy question of whether to dispose of Piedras Negras is beyond its scope.
142. Cf U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 5, 4(e); OECD Model Income Tax Convention,
art. 5, 4(e). It is true that this model treaty language is not controlling in this context, not only because
it is "model" treaty language, but because it addresses the permanent establishment issue and not the
Code's conduct of a trade or business within the U.S. issue. Nevertheless, it does provide a helpful
articulation of what types of activities are qualitatively excluded from bringing a foreign trade or
business into the United States.
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discontinuous, and minimal.
C. ILLUSTRATIVE STATUTORY RULES
There are a few of statutory rules that apply to U.S. services in
specific contexts. As further outlined infra, these specific statutory rules in
no way undermine Proposition 3 that regularity, continuity, and
considerableness of U.S. activity are not the test for whether a foreign trade
or business has been brought into the United States. Each of these
particular-circumstance rules, even the commercial traveler rule, imposes
qualitative conditions on treatment as the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States.
i. Commercial Traveler Rule
The performance of personal services within the U.S. by a nonresident
alien individual is not the conduct of a trade or business within the U.S.
if.
14 3
" The individual is temporarily present in the U.S. for periods
totaling not more than 90 days during the tax year;
* The aggregate compensation for those services is not more than
$3,000; and
* The individual performs the services either for
- A nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or foreign
corporation not engaged in a trade or business within the U.S.,
or
- An office or place of business in a foreign country or U.S.
possession maintained there by a U.S. citizen or resident,
domestic partnership, or domestic corporation.
It is immaterial whether the services performed by the nonresident alien
individual are performed as an employee or under any other form of
contract with the person for whom the services are performed.'44
Clearly this exclusion has both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
The services must not exceed either 90 days during a tax year or $3,000 in
compensation. At the same time, that aspect is not sufficient to qualify for
the exclusion. Even relatively minor services performed by a nonresident
alien individual will constitute the conduct of a trade or business within the
U.S. if performed for a U.S. office of a U.S. citizen or resident, domestic
143. I.R.C. § 864(b)(1) (2008).
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(b)(2)(iii) (2008).
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partnership, or domestic corporation.
ii. Foreign Government Employees
A special rule generally excludes from gross income any wages, fees,
or salary of any employee of a foreign government or of an international
organization received as compensation for official services to that
government or international organization.145  Strictly speaking this is an
exclusion of some amounts from gross income, and it is not an exemption
from having a trade or business within the United States. Thus, an
individual's other U.S. income, including services income, could well be
subject to U.S. net basis taxation, 46 unless some other exemption applies.
Nevertheless, it is interesting in this context because this exclusion from
U.S. taxation is premised on a set of qualitative requirements and not on
any quantitative threshold.
The employee cannot be a U.S. citizen, except that an employee that is
a citizen of the Philippines can be a U.S. citizen. 47 In addition, in the case
of an employee of a foreign government, both of the following must be
true:
* The services must be of a character similar to those performed by
employees of the Government of the United States in foreign
countries. 148
* There must be an equivalent exemption granted by the foreign
government to employees of the Government of the United States
performing similar services in the foreign country.
149
The State Department certifies to the Treasury the names of the foreign
countries that grant an equivalent exemption to the employees of the
Government of the United States performing services in those foreign
countries. It also certifies the character of the services performed by
employees of the Government of the United States in foreign countries. 5 °
145. I.R.C. § 893(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.893-1. The exemption extends to apply to a consular
or other officer, or a nondiplomatic representative. Treas. Reg. § 1.893-1.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.893-1(a)(3). See also Van der Elst v. Comm'r, 223 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1955).
147. I.R.C. § 893(a)(1).
148. Id. § 893(a)(2).
149. Id. § 893(a)(3).
150. Id. § 893(b). The exclusion does not apply to either: any employee of a commercial entity
controlled by a foreign government, id § 893(c)(1); see also id. § 892(a)(2)(B); or any employee of a
foreign government whose services are primarily in connection with a foreign government's
commercial activity, either inside or outside the United States, id. § 893(c)(2).
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iii. Exchange and Training Programs
A nonresident alien individual who is temporarily present within the
U.S. under a special visa for an exchange or training program 5' is treated
as engaged in a trade or business within the U.S., even if the individual is
not otherwise engaged in a trade or business within the United States.'52
Such an individual's U.S. source income from the taxable portion of some
kinds of fellowship and scholarship grants, and any taxable reimbursed
expenses, are taxed as effectively connected with a trade or business within
the U.S., and so are taxed on a net basis.'53
D. REAL PROPERTY ACTIVITY-A POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT CASE
Real property activity in the U.S. may or may not constitute the
conduct of a trade or business within the United States. It could be a
passive investment, which is not a trade or business at all, but it could also
be an active business. This is one area in which the factual case-by-case
inquiry makes it particularly easy to confuse the question of quality of
activity with quantity of activity. It is tempting to confuse the question of
active management, which converts passive investment into a trade or
business, with a quantity-of-activity analysis. The lack of a clear threshold
in the definition of active management makes this especially tempting. In
the end, however, the distinction between investment activity and trade or
business activity is not the number or extensiveness of real property
holdings. Rather, the key question is the qualitative one of whether
management of the holdings is active enough to achieve the transition from
investment to business.'54
It is helpful that there are two statutory rules that have the effect of
resolving many of the questions in this area. First, under the Foreign
Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA), gain or loss from the
disposition of a U.S. real property interest is treated as if the taxpayer were
151. 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(15)(F), (J), (M), or (Q) (2000).
152. I.R.C. § 871(c).
153. Id. §§ 871(c), 1441(b). See also Treas. Reg § 1.871-9 (2008). To the extent that this type of
income is subject to withholding at the source, the withholding tax rate is 14 percent and not the usual
30 percent I.R.C. § 1441(a)&(b). Some amounts paid by a foreign employer in connection with
temporary presence in the U.S. for exchange or training programs are excluded from gross income
entirely. Id. § 872(b)(3).
154 See Charles D. Rubin & Robert F. Hudson, Federal Taxation of Foreign Investment in U.S.
Real Estate, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 912, 1996 (presenting an overview of the trade or business
question in the real property context).
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engaged in a trade or business within the U.S. and as if the gain or loss
were effectively connected to it.' The implication of FIRPTA is that
treatment of U.S. property sales has been resolved.'56 There remains then
real property rental activity and mineral working interest income to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.
The second statutory simplification is that foreign taxpayers can elect
to treat income from U.S. real estate as trade or business income, if the real
estate investments do not otherwise constitute a trade or business within the
United States.'57 The general purpose of the election is to permit the real
property income to be taxed on a net basis, thereby allowing related
deductions to be taken into account, without needing to make a factual
determination that the income derives from a trade or business.
158
In the absence of such an election, real property rental activity can be
a passive investment.'59 On the other hand, active management can convert
real property rental into a trade or business. For example, U.S. activities
(through an agent) of leasing properties, paying operating expenses, taxes,
mortgage interest and other necessary obligations, and selling and
purchasing U.S. property were sufficient to treat a foreign taxpayer as
conducting a trade or business within the U.S. 16  Likewise, executing
leases, renting property, collecting rents, keeping books of account,
supervising repairs, paying taxes and mortgage interest, insuring property,
and purchasing and selling property were sufficient to constitute a trade or
business within the U.S. 6'
155. See I.R.C. § 897(a). For a more extensive discussion of FIRPTA, see Rubin & Hudson, supra
note 154.
156. FIRPTA's driving purpose was to prevent foreign investments in U.S. real property from
escaping U.S. taxation entirely. Nevertheless, it does serve to simplify the question of whether an
investment in U S. real property should be treated as the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States. There are authorities relating to the question of whether a person who buys and sells U.S.
real property is engaged in a trade or business within the Untied States. Compare Pinchot, 113 F.2d at
719 with Investors' Mortgage Sec. Co. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 45 (1945); Snell v. Comm'r, 97
F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1938). In general, because of FIRPTA, their interest today is for the broader
proposition of distinguishing a passive investment from an activity that amounts to a trade or business.
157. I.R.C. §§ 871(d), 882(d).
158. The ALl proposed that all real estate income be taxed on a net basis to eliminate the
administrative and compliance burden of making elections. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES TAXATION 10 1-02 (1987). The
ALI's proposal is presumably premised on a belief that by and large foreign taxpayers would benefit
from the net basis election and fail to make it only by mistake. Taxpayers that fail to make the election
are subject to a 30 percent tax on their gross real estate income, I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a). Gross basis
taxation could easily equate to a confiscatory net-basis tax burden that makes particular real estate
investments economically unsustainable.
159. See, e.g., Herbert v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 26, 33 (1958), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 6; Neill v. Comm'r, 46
B.T.A. 197, 198 (1942); Rev. Rul. 73-522, 1973-2 C.B. 226.
160 Pinchot, 113 F.2d at 719.
161. Lewenhaupt v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 151, 162-63 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1955). See
also De Amodio v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 894, 904-05 (1960), aff'd, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); Investors'
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In the context of domestic taxpayers, an owner that manages even a
single property has been considered to conduct a trade or business.'62 If a
single rental property can constitute a trade or business entirely on its own,
for a foreign taxpayer the issue is not the amount of U.S. property involved.
Instead, the distinction is between management of the rental property (even
through an agent) versus the holding of U.S. real property purely as an
investment. That principle has also been recognized in the international
context. 163
Mineral interests are subject to a similar logic.'64 A right to extract
minerals from land is commonly referred to as a "working interest." For
example, a lease giving a leaseholder the right to extract oil and gas from
land for as long as the land will produce is a "working interest." A
working interest is frequently a fractional interest in the mineral extraction
rights. A working interest may be a trade or business or a passive
investment. To be engaged in a business requires active involvement,
directly or through an agent, in the operation of the business.'65 A large
enough interest would allow the holder to operate mineral extraction
operation indirectly through an operating company and achieve the same
result as if the holder operated it directly.1
66
A case in point is DiPortanova v. United States.167  Enrico
DiPortanova, a nonresident alien, owned an interest in several trusts that
held an oil and gas lease working interest. 68 Collectively among the trusts,
the working interest was a 2.27 percent interest in an oil and gas field that
was operated by multiple working interest holders as a unit. Quintana
Petroleum Corporation, a corporation operated the field for them under an
operating agreement that reserved overall supervision and control to the
working interest holders acting collectively. 170 Holders with a combined
interest of at least 10 percent interest could call a meeting of all of the
working interest holders.171  A 60 percent interest vote was necessary to
Mortgage, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) at 45; Barbour v. Comm'r, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 216 (1944).
162 Lagreide v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 508, 512 (1954) (holding that rental of a single house constituted
the conduct of a trade or business, the income of which therefore reduced the taxpayers' net operating
loss).
163. De A modio, 34 T.C. at 904-905 (concluding that active management of a single rental property,
while pursuing acquisition of others, was sufficient to constitute the conduct of a trade or business
within the U.S.).
164 See Rev. Rul. 68-226, 1968-1 C.B. 362 (treating an oil and gas working interest as real
property for tax purposes).
165. DiPortanova v. United States, 690 F.2d 169, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
166. Hendrickson v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (1987). Cf Rev. Rul. 58-166, 1958-1 C.B.
324.
167. 690 F.2dat 169.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 174-76.
170 Id.
171. Id.
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remove Quintana, the operator, and a 75 percent interest vote was
necessary to decide other issues.1 7 ' Although the trusts' interest gave it the
right to participate in operation, it was not enough to constitute active
participation in the business. 173 The 2.27 percent interest was a passive
investment and not the conduct of a trade or business."4 Therefore,
DiPortanova also was not considered to conduct a trade or business within
the United States .
In contrast to a working interest, a royalty interest is a right to oil and
gas in place that entitles its owner to a specified fraction, in kind or value,
of the total production from the property, free of expense of development
and operation. A royalty interest owner is therefore not in the business of
producing oil and gas since the owner has neither the right nor the burden
of developing and exploiting the property. 1
76
VIII. CONTRARY AUTHORITIES?
A number, but by no means all, of the reported decisions in this area
contain language that can be interpreted as examining the quantum of U.S.
activity. They refer to a test of the regularity, continuity and
considerableness of U.S. activity. If this Article is to fulfill its interpretive
mission, it must address these cases.
One potential response would be to assert that, to the extent these
authorities hold that a minimum quantum of U.S. activity is a necessary
condition to bring a foreign trade or business into the U.S., they are simply
wrong. While such an analytical move might have some satisfaction it is
not appropriate for this Article, the mission of which is the interpretative
assimilation of the existing authorities into a meaningful and useful set of
legal standards. Moreover, this Article does not reject a quantitative
analysis per se. Proposition 2 validates a quantitative analysis, because
regularity, continuity, and considerableness of U.S. activity can be
sufficient to establish the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. On the other
hand, Proposition 3 asserts that there is no minimum quantum of U.S.
activity necessary to bring a foreign trade or business into the United
States. A necessary task for this Article, therefore, is to reconcile
Proposition 3 with the existence of authorities that assert that both a





176. Rev. Rul. 69-355, 1969-1 C.B. 65.
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A. CASE-BY-CASE FACTUAL DISTINCTIONS
One approach to this problem is to examine the cases individually in
light of their particular factual circumstances. Regardless of what a court
actually asserts it is deciding, it is axiomatic that it has only the authority to
decide "the particular dispute which is before it ... [and] everything... in
an opinion, is to be read with primary reference to the particular
dispute .... ' One is hard-pressed to find a case asserting a predicate of
some minimum quantitative threshold of U.S. activity in which that
assertion was actually necessary to resolve the factual situation presented.
An individual examination of commonly cited cases is instructive.
Based on the factual circumstances actually presented, these courts had no
need to establish a legal principle that negates the principle expressed in
this Article by Proposition 3. In that sense, to the extent that they assert, or
can be interpreted as asserting, that some minimum quantum of U.S.
activity is necessary to bring a foreign trade or business into the U.S., those
assertions are dicta.
Some cases that can be cited because they refer explicitly to
regularity, continuity and considerableness in their analysis also conclude
that a trade or business within the U.S. exists based solely on the foreign
taxpayer's U.S. activities. They find a U.S. trade or business while
disregarding the taxpayer's foreign activities entirely.'78 Therefore,
regardless of language they use to the contrary, they do not resolve the
analytical problem of a foreign taxpayer that engages in some trade or
business somewhere in the world, but the U.S. activities of which are not
sufficient in themselves to constitute a trade or business.
Some cases refer to a quantitative test, but find that no trade or
business was conducted within the U.S. because the U.S. connections were
for investment and not for business.'7 9 Revenue Ruling 73-522"8 illustrates
this phenomenon. The taxpayer was a nonresident alien individual.'81
During 1971, the only activity in the U.S. in which the taxpayer engaged
was as described here. The taxpayer owned rental property situated in the
177. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 42-43 (Oceana ed. 1978) (emphasis omitted).
178. See, e.g, Pinchot, 113 F.2d at 718; De Amodio v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 894 (1960); Lewenhaupt,
20 T.C. at 151 (1953), Perez v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1988); see also supra notes 56-72 and
accompanying text. Strictly speaking, Perez states that, "A foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade or
business within the United States if the taxpayer, continuously and regularly, transacts a substantial
portion of its ordinary business within the United States during a substantial portion of the taxable
year." 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 317. It does not assert that they are a necessary condition.
179. See, e.g., Herbert, 30 T.C. at 33.
180. 1973-2 C.B. 226.
181. The taxpayer did not elect to treat real property income as income effectively connected with
the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. See I.R.C. § 87 1(d) (2008).
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U.S. that was subject to long-term leases.'2 Each lease provided for a
minimum monthly rental and the payment by the lessee of real estate taxes,
operating expenses, ground rent, repairs, interest and principal on existing
mortgages, and insurance in connection with the property leased. 83 The
leases were referred to as "net leases" and were entered into by the
taxpayer on December 1, 1971.84 The taxpayer visited the U.S. for
approximately one week during November of 1971 for the purpose of
supervising new leasing negotiations, attending conferences, making phone
calls, drafting documents, and making significant decisions with respect to
the leases."" This was the taxpayer's only visit to the U.S. during 1971.186
The leases were identical in form (net leases) to those applicable to the
properties owned by the taxpayer before December 1, 1971.E 7 The lessees
were unrelated to each other or to the taxpayer.' 8' The negotiation of new
leases in the U.S. did not transform this investment from a passive
investment into a trade or business.1 89 The taxpayer was not considered to
conduct a trade or business within the U.S. during the taxable year ended
December 31, 1971.19
The Service's analysis asserts that the November 1971 trip to the U.S.
did not bring the trade or business into the U.S. because it was sporadic,
irregular, and minimal. 9  This quantitative analysis, however, is
unnecessary and beside the point. The investments described in the revenue
ruling were net leases in which the lessee took on all of the responsibilities
otherwise the responsibility of active management. In short, the
investments were purely passive investments to the lessor. In November
1971, the taxpayer acquired additional such passive investments. A
qualitative analysis excludes this investment activity from counting toward
the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. That makes the
quantitative analysis unnecessary.
Another good illustration is Continental Trading, Inc., which existed
for the purpose of managing an investment portfolio for Axel Werner-
Gren. 92 That activity clearly was not the conduct of a trade or business.193
Its only non-investment activity, anywhere in the world, was also
insufficient to constitute any trade or business.










192. Cont'l Trading, Inc. v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 40, 40-44 (9th Cir. 1959).
193. See supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text.
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Its non-investment activities were a very small number of "isolated
and noncontinuous" transactions.'94 These transactions were more related
to the separate business of Grover Turnbow, who was also Continental's
president, than they were to Continental's investment portfolio.
These were of three kinds: (1) In July, 1948 .... [Continental]
purchased a carload of dry milk fat from Kraft Foods Company for
$46,212.75 and sold it one month later through one of Turnbow's
companies for $40,248. (2) As an accommodation to a Mexican
corporation ... [it] purchased, in 1950, equipment for that corporation
for which it was reimbursed without profit. (3) In all three years [under
consideration,] ... [it] bought tin cans for milk products which were
needed by... one of Turnbow's companies.... [Only] nominal
amounts of income result[ed] from transactions relating to cans used by
[Turnbow's company] .... In 1948, such reported income amounted to
$120.64; in 1949, $3,509.90; in 1950, $5,239.19.... There was no
business purpose connected with the can transactions engaged in by
[Continental] .... It never used its Nevada office in these operations. It
carried no inventory of cans and ordered no cans other than
those . . .9'
These were Continental's only non-investment transactions anywhere in
the world.'9 6 In contrast, during those same years Continental's gross
income, overwhelmingly from investment activities, was $817,791.39 for
1948, $605,635.10 for 1949, and $446,863.19 for 1950.197
The regularity, continuity, and considerableness of Continental's non-
investment activities was pertinent to determining whether it was engaged
in a trade or business at all anywhere in the world. 98 It was not so engaged.
Thus, the resolution of this case provides no support for a claim that the
quantity of U.S. activity is relevant in determining whether an admitted
foreign trade or business is being conducted within the United States.
Continental was not engaged in a trade or business anywhere in the world,
therefore, it could not be engaged in a trade or business within the United
States.
Other commonly cited cases refer to a minimum quantitative threshold
of U.S. activities and find that it is satisfied. Nevertheless, they conclude,
on qualitative grounds, that the U.S. activities do not constitute the conduct
of a trade or business within the United States. 9 9 These cases also do not
194. Cont ' Trading, 265 F.2d at 44.
195. Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Cont'l Trading, Inc. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 724 (1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d 40 (9th Cir.
1959).
197. Cont "I Trading, 265 F.2d at 42.
198. Id. at45.
199. Scottish Am. Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 49, 58-60 (1949); Spermacet, 30 T.C. 633-34;
European Naval Stores, II T.C. at 132.
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establish a minimum quantum of U.S. activity to bring a foreign trade or
business into the U.S., because their assertions of a quantitative threshold
are dicta.
Linen Thread v. Commissioner2°° provides a good example of how a
qualitative exclusion implies that reference to a quantitative threshold is
dicta. The taxpayer had an agent at an office in the United States. Aside
from investment related activities, the agent's tasks were limited to
investigating and reporting on new fibers and maintaining a set of books.2"'
The taxpayer's remaining connections to the United States were two sales
of merchandise to U.S. persons.2°2  Those sales, however, were
consummated directly into the U.S. from Scotland without the involvement
of a U.S. office or agent. °3 The taxpayer's U.S. office played no role in the
solicitation or consummation of the sales, or any other sales.2 4 It performed
only clerical acts limited to the delivery of goods, handling of paperwork,
and collection of payments.205 Thus, the U.S. activities were only clerical
and ancillary in nature.0 6 An examination of their extensiveness or of the
numerosity of the transactions to which they were related is immaterial,
and the court's reference to the test being both quantitative and
qualitative20 7 is dicta.
The two cases that come nearest to actually depending for their
dispositions on a minimum quantitative threshold are European Naval
Stores Co., S.A. v. Commissioner28 and Pasquel v. Commissioner.0 9 In the
end, however, a minimum quantum of U.S. activity-regularity, continuity,
and considerableness-is not actually necessary to the resolution of either.
Jorge Pasquel, a nonresident alien individual, acquired a partial
interest in two war surplus landing ships from a corporation, Higgins, Inc.,
that was already under contract to purchase the ships from the U.S.
government.210 Pasquel shared in the proceeds of the sale of the ships to the
Government of Argentina.' He entered into the transaction entirely from
Mexico and, aside from this transaction, had no other economic connection
to the United States. This decision is explained simply on the principle
that the purchase of property in the U.S. for resale abroad is not sufficient
200. 14 T C. 725 (1950).
201. Id. at 725-30.




206 Id at 734-36.
207. Id. at 736.
208. 11 T.C. 127 (1948), acq 1948-2 C.B. 2.
209. 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1431 (1953).
210. Id.
211. 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1431.
212. Id.
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by itself to bring such a foreign taxpayer's foreign trade or business into the
United States, without regard to the extent of the U.S. purchases.213
In the alternative, the interest in question could easily be classified as
a security interest in respect of a loan. The taxpayer was given oral
214
assurance by Higgins, Inc., that he would suffer no loss in the transaction.
In addition, a chattel mortgage was made for the protection of the
taxpayer's investment.215  Last, relative to Higgins, Inc., the taxpayer
enjoyed priority in receipt of the ultimate sales price.2t 6 Under this reading,
the taxpayer made a loan 217 that amounted to a passive investment position,
and investment activity does not itself cause a foreign person to conduct a
trade or business within the United States.18
European Naval Stores Co., S.A., a Belgian corporation, purchased
certain goods in the U.S. for resale abroad but they proved undeliverable
because of World War II and were deteriorating while sitting in the U.S.
warehouse. 219  The U.S. seller, Peninsular-Lurton Co., unilaterally
repurchased the goods, without the knowledge or consent of the foreign
purchaser. 22' The U.S. seller did so at the then-current market price,
crediting a profit to the foreign purchaser.2 2  The foreign purchaser was not
thereby engaged in a trade or business within the United States.
Notwithstanding the court's protestations to the contrary,222 it does
seem crucial to this decision that the sale in the U.S. was unplanned and
compelled by the force majeure of the World War II. A telling aspect of
this decision is the allusion to an unpressed transfer pricing issue.223
European Naval Stores and Peninsular-Lurton were conceded to be under
common control 4.2 2  The repurchase at then-current market prices generated
a profit for European Naval Stores that was not taxable unless it was treated
as engaged in a trade or business within the United States. The related U.S.
corporation no doubt recognized an equal loss. If the repurchase had been
213. See British Timken, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 880 (1949); Amalgamated Dental Co. v.
Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1009, 1014 (1946).
214. Pasquel, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1431
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1432.
217. Id. at 1432-33.
218. See supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text. In addition, in Pasquel the Tax Court's
factual presentation focuses on the single transaction and does not indicate whether the taxpayer was
engaged in a trade or business outside the United States. Pasquel, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1431-32. If he
was not engaged in a trade or business on a worldwide basis, he could not have been engaged in a trade
or business within the United States. Nevertheless, this is speculative given the available factual record.
219. European Naval Stores, II T.C. at 129-30.
220. Id. at 132
221. Id. at 128-31.
222. Id. at 133, 135.
223. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 45. For the text of the provision, which is continued in
the currently applicable law as I.R.C. § 482 (2008), see Pub. L. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1, 25 (1939).
224 European Naval Stores, 11 T.C. at 134.
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at a price no higher than the original sale, there would not have been any
such pairing of a U.S. loss and a foreign related-party gain. In that sense,
there would have been no particularly good reason for the Service to pursue
the trade or business issue.
A rational and informed taxpayer would seriously hesitate to use
Pasquel or European Naval Stores as authority to plan to purchase and
resell even small amounts of goods in the U.S. and claim not to conduct a
trade or business within the United States. It is not surprising to find
qualitative exclusions in cases with minimal quantity of connection. A
taxpayer would be foolish to rely exclusively on de minimis contact to
avoid U.S. conduct of a trade or business, given the authorities finding such
conduct with minimal conduct. Likewise, the Service's own rulings on the
sufficiency of minimal contact counsel it to have a qualitative argument
available. The crucial comparison is that there are authorities using
qualitative grounds to find no U.S. conduct of a trade or business
notwithstanding large numbers of transactions but there are also authorities
finding in favor of such conduct with minimal U.S. transactions. That
observation indicates that it is the qualitative, not the quantitative, issue that
is controlling, which makes the quantitative issue dispensable in deciding
whether a foreign trade or business has been brought into the United States.
B. CASES VIEWED JOINTLY
While each of these authorities can be distinguished on its facts in a
way that makes a contradiction of Proposition 3 dicta, the number of these
cases does make something of an impression on its own. This suggests an
examination of this body of cases as a whole to consider the origin of these
assertions of a predicate minimum quantitative threshold, viewed purely as
assertions and not as essential elements to the resolution of actual cases.2 5
Can that origin be explained in ways that preserve the validity of
Proposition 3, notwithstanding assertions seemingly to the contrary?
With very few exceptions,226 the authorities give no indication at all as
to why they articulate regular, considerable, and continuous U.S. activity as
a predicate threshold. A real possibility is that the references to quantity-
to regularity, continuity, and considerableness--of activity were based on
225. A further consideration is the difficulty of proving the non-existence of other cases. A diligent
search sought every decision articulating a minimum quantitative threshold-that is, regularity,
continuity, and considerableness-for finding the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States. Nevertheless, it is difficult to prove that no other cases exist. This in itself counsels a
consideration of these cases as a body, rather than relying solely upon the case-by-case distinguishing
analysis.
226. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
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an unconsidered and unnecessary mimicking of the standard applied in the
purely domestic context. An articulation of the standard was needed, and
courts, focusing on the expression "trade or business" rather than the
foreign taxpayer context in which it appeared, simply copied the standard
from the domestic context without any particular justification for so
doing.227 Once that standard had been transposed in this manner to the
international context, it became the path of least resistance to repeat it
reflexively without consideration of any justification.
Nevertheless, as the case-by-case distinguishing analysis
demonstrates, 228 there are a number of reasons why conflating the domestic
and international contexts did no harm in the sense that it did not affect the
cases' dispositions. A taxpayer might not engage in a trade or business
anywhere in the world,229 or its U.S. activities might be sufficient in
themselves to constitute a trade or business.23 0 In either circumstance, no
harm was done because the problem of bringing a foreign trade or business
into the U.S. was not presented. Another possibility was that none of the
taxpayer's U.S. activities "counted" in the determination. 3' Qualitative
grounds caused the U.S. activities to be set aside, which in turn set the
quantity of U.S. activity measurement to zero, thereby mooting the issue of
a minimum quantitative threshold.
This pattern of cases presents a marvelous illustration of Karl
Llewellyn's classic explanation of the necessity of a concept of dicta in the
common law system. Presented with the need to dispose of a single case
with a limited set of facts in a timely manner, a court seeks an articulation
of a neutral principle to apply. In those circumstances, it adopts an
articulation that is overly broad in the sense that, taken literally, it resolves
a swathe of cases not actually presented or considered. The risk of this
type of overstatement is accentuated when the articulation is adopted
wholesale from another area without an opportunity to consider carefully
whether that is appropriate. It is only later factual scenarios that
demonstrate its excessive breadth. Fortunately, stare decisis does not make
227. See Pinchot, 113 F.2d at 718; Linen Thread Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. at 725; European Naval
Stores, 11 T.C. at 132; Cont'l Trading, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 724. In the earliest of these cases, Pinchot,
not only was the domestic standard imported into the international context, it was also imported from
the income tax context to the estate tax context. In that sense, it was a doubly unconsidered adoption of
a standard from another context.
228. See supra notes 177-222 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Cont 'l Trading, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) at 724.
230. See, e.g., Pinchot, 113 F.2d at 718; De Amodio v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 894 (1960); Lewenhaupt v.
Comm'r, 20 T.C. at 151; Perez v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1988).
231. It is possible to exclude all of the U.S. activity on account of being investment activity, see,
e.g., Herbert, 30 T.C. at 33-34; Pasquel v. Comm'r, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1431 (1953), or some other form
of ancillary activity, see, e.g., Spermacet, 30 T.C. at 633-34; European Naval Stores, 11 T.C. at 132;
Pasquel, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1431, or a combination of the two, see, e.g., Linen Thread, 14 T.C. at
730-31.
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it inevitable that overly broad statements control those later cases.232
Even in the absence of an express justification, however, there may be
some unstated justification of the form of the standard's articulation. One
possibility is that imposing net basis taxation on foreign taxpayers whose
U.S. economic connections do not reach a minimum quantitative threshold
imposes unjustifiable administration and compliance costs on the Service
and foreign taxpayers respectively. Therefore, according to the argument,
the minimum quantitative threshold served-and does serve-to mitigate
the imposition of administrative and compliance costs that are out of
proportion to the amount of tax at stake.233 Viewed from a policy
perspective, this line of reasoning certainly holds some attraction. This
Article does not dispute that administrability and compliance issues could
well caution such a quantitative threshold.
This Article's mission, however, is interpretive. The question is
whether the minimum quantitative threshold, as the existing authorities
articulate it and placing those articulations in their contextual environment,
can be convincingly rationalized by solicitude for administrability and
compliance issues. Those authorities articulate a predicate threshold that
U.S. activities must be regular, continuous, and considerable in all cases,
but give no real guidance as to how much activity is necessary to satisfy
that criteria. The environment in which that articulation subsists is one in
which some relatively minor U.S. connections have been sufficient to bring
a foreign trade or business into the U.S.,234 but fairly regular, continuous,
and considerable activity has frequently not been sufficient because it was
investment activity or was in some other sense ancillary, clerical, or
ministerial. 235 Viewed as a matter of interpretation-rather than efficacious
policy-administrative and compliance concerns do not justify a minimum
232. LLEWELLYN, supra note 177, at 43-45. As Professor Llewellyn explained:
You reach, at random if hurried, more carefully if not, for a foundation, for a
major premise. But never for itself. Its interest lies in leading to the conclusion
you are headed for. You shape its words, its content, to an end decreed. More,
with your mind upon your object you use words, you bring in illustrations, you
deploy and advance and concentrate again. When you have done, you have said
much you did not mean. You did not mean, that is, except in reference to your
point.
Id. at 45.
233. It is worth noting that, in this context, solicitude for taxpayers would be directed primarily
toward the burdens of complying with the tax and not with the burden of paying the tax. The effectively
connected concept is the primary mechanism for defining and limiting the extent of the U.S. tax burden
for foreign taxpayers engaged in low levels of trade or business within the United States. It ensures, to
the extent that it fulfills its function, that the U.S. tax burden is not excessive in comparison to the
extent of U.S. business activity. See supra notes 102-110 and accompanying text. Thus, the concept of
trade or business within the U.S. could not be the primary protection against disproportionate tax
burden.
234. See supra notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 11 1-142and accompanying text.
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quantitative threshold for the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States, at least not as it has been enunciated over the years.
From the tax administration perspective, an office or fixed place of
business standard could significantly mitigate the burden imposed upon the
Service. In the absence of such a standard, however, a generalized
minimum quantitative threshold theory, with no guidance as to what is the
minimum quantum, does nothing to reduce the Service's administrative
burden. It remains obliged to consider each taxable year of each taxpayer
on a factual case-by-case basis. 36 It has the same burden of deciding
whether the burden of enforcement action is justifiable in each case, with or
without an undefined minimum quantitative threshold. The addition of
such a legal standard adds nothing meaningful to the Service's existing
ability to minimize wasted administrative costs via its discretion in
bringing enforcement actions." 7 This is not to deny that a more coherent
standard-such as an "office or fixed place of business" standard-might
be justifiable as a matter of policy. Such a standard could ease
enforcement by creating a bright line, or at least a brighter line." 8
Nevertheless, as a matter of interpretation, the minimum quantum
formulation as it has been expressed advances no meaningful
administrability concern.
A similar analysis applies in viewing taxpayer compliance burdens.
As a policy matter, there is more than a little justification in allowing a
threshold below which the compliance costs of net basis taxation are not
imposed. Once again, an office or fixed place of business standard is one
candidate that comes to mind as a kind of safe harbor. 39
There is nothing of a safe harbor, however, in a generalized minimum
quantitative threshold that provides no guidance as to what is the minimum
quantum, and exists simultaneously with a qualitative threshold. As
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(e) (2008). See also Rev. Rul. 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 268.
237. The need to maintain administrative flexibility undoubtedly figures significantly in the
Service's reluctance to issue a ruling on whether a foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business
within the United States. See Rev. Proc. 2007-7, 2007-1 I.R.B. 227. The list of areas in which the
Service will not issue rulings is renewed annually in a revenue procedure published in the first Internal
Revenue Bulletin of the year.
238. It does appear in practice that the permanent establishment concept does deal with
administrability in a manner that the trade or business within the U.S. standard does not address it. For
example, a foreign individual that owned and operated a foreign racehorse stable brought a single
racehorse into the U S. to participate in a single race. The Service concluded that participation in that
one race was sufficient to constitute the conduct in the US. of a trade or business. However, it also
indicated that the taxpayer would be permitted to establish the absence of a permanent establishment by
providing definite information of having no intention of entering a horse in a second race during the
same taxable year. Rev. Rul. 58-63, 1958-1 C.B. 624, amplified in Rev. Rul. 60-249, 1960-2 C.B. 264.
239. Another conceivable form of taxpayer-friendly safe harbor might be to eliminate the return
filing obligation, see I.R.C § 6012 (2008), below some threshold level of income subject to U.S. net
basis taxation.
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described supra, the decided cases provide no reliable guidance as to how
much U.S. activity exceeds the supposed threshold. As enunciated, a
quantitative theory creates uncertainty as to whether taxpayers have
incurred U.S. net-basis compliance obligations. Moreover, imposing two
standards simultaneously-here both quantitative and qualitative-serves
to increase uncertainty of classification not to decrease it.240 Once again,
whatever might be justifiable from a policy perspective, from an
interpretive perspective solicitude about taxpayers' compliance obligations
cannot justify the existing formulations of a minimum quantitative
threshold.24'
In no way does this argument deny that Congress certainly could
impose a minimum quantitative threshold. 42 The argument is solely that
administrative and compliance issues are unsustainable as justifications for
interpreting the historic, and existing, Code provisions as imposing the
undefined minimum quantitative threshold as it has been expressed in case
law.
C. HISTORICALLY CONTEXTUAL VIEW
Another possible justification of these articulations of the standard,
even when viewed purely as dicta, is that, at the time, they served to
discourage or mitigate a perceived problem of foreign taxpayer
manipulation to gain unintended benefits of net basis taxation. An
historically contextual view of the cases presents a good case for such an
explanation of the manner in which the standard was articulated.
Nevertheless, that concern was predicated on the state of the Code at that
time. Later amendments to the Code have obviated that justification. As a
240. Cf H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1942), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAW 1953-1939 1877 (1954)
(arguing that using two different tests for imposition of net basis taxation increases uncertainty
unnecessarily, which was one justification for eliminating one of them via the Revenue Act of 1942).
241. If a particular taxpayer did avoid U.S. taxation based on some minimum quantitative threshold,
it would certainly be pleased. Nevertheless, the standard is not predictable enough to allow a foreign
taxpayer to rely ex ante exclusively on a quantitative analysis. It is hard to see the unreliable prospect of
saving some tax as well as the cost of compliance as a justification for a minimum quantitative
threshold, at least not using the unpredictable articulation it has taken.
242. An argument that this Article does not raise is one premised on what Congress could have done
but did not. It is true that if Congress were concerned about administrative or compliance issues it
could have adopted an office or fixed place of business predicate or it could have adopted the
effectively connected concept much sooner than it actually did. That it did not do so would not
necessarily have deterred courts from finding a corrective to those concerns via interpretation. In that
vein, taxpayer manipulation concerns are discussed infra, see notes 243-264 and accompanying text.
Congress could equally have addressed this taxpayer manipulation concern. That it did not do so could
well have been argued as a justification for not intervening judicially, but in practice it does not appear
to have prevented that intervention.
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result, it is no longer controlling.
Of particular importance is the history of the evolution in foreign
taxpayers' access to net basis taxation. A foreign taxpayer subject to gross
basis taxation loses the tax benefit of any deductions or credits that would
properly be allocated and apportioned to that U.S. source gross income.
Many foreign taxpayers with significant U.S. source passive investment
income could significantly reduce their U.S. tax liability if they could
arrange to bring it within the net basis tax regime. Before 1936, this was a
fairly simple question. Foreign taxpayers not otherwise subject to U.S. net
basis taxation were permitted functionally to elect it for all of their U.S.
source income simply by filing a tax return.243
In 1936, however, net basis taxation became applicable only to foreign
taxpayers that either engaged in a trade or business within the U.S. or had a
U.S. office or place of business.2" The interaction of that provision and the
force of attraction principle resulted in a substantial tax planning
opportunity. If a foreign taxpayer qualified at all for net basis taxation,
then the force of attraction principle caused all of its U.S. source income to
receive net basis taxation and, therefore, reduction by appropriate
deductions.2 45  Access to the dividends received deduction 246 was
particularly significant to foreign corporations that were substantial holders
of the stock of domestic corporations.
On the other hand, this interaction of net basis taxation and the force
of attraction principle was foreclosed to a foreign taxpayer that neither
conducted a trade or business within the U.S. nor maintained a U.S. office
or place of business. For the tax years before 1942, minimally establishing
one of those two was the plan of many foreign taxpayers. The path of least
resistance for many was to assert the existence of a U.S. office with the
most minimal factual foundation defensible.247
The Revenue Act of 1942 deleted the references to "an office or place
of business" from the pertinent provisions of the Code.248 Concern about
manipulative technical planning to achieve the benefits of net basis taxation
243. See Kaufmian, supra note 12, at 765-67.
244. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. 74-740, ch. 690, §§ 211, 231, 49 Stat. 1648, 1714-15, 1717
(1935-36). See also Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §§ 211, 231. For the text of these latter provisions,
see Pub. L. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1, 75-76, 78 (1939).
245. See S. REP. No. 89-1707 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4446, 4462-63, 4477-78
(explaining force of attraction principle). See also 2 Philip F. Postlewaite, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL § 19.11 (3d ed. 1998).
246. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. 74-740, ch. 690, §§ 26(b), 119(b), 232(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1664,
1694, 1717 (1935-36).
247. See, e.g., The Scottish Am. Inv. Co., Ltd., v. Comm'r, 47 B.T.A. 474 (1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d
419 (4th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 323 U.S. 119 (1944); Aktiebolaget Separator v. Comrn'r, 45 B.T.A. 243
(1941); Recherches Industrielles, S.A., R.I.S.A. v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 253 (1941).
248. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-753, ch. 619, § 160(d), 56 Stat. 798, 861 (1942).
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was prominent in the House Ways and Means Committee's
recommendation of the change.
A tendency has arisen, principally on the part of foreign
corporations which are substantial holders of the stock of domestic
corporations and, occasionally on the part of nonresident alien
individuals, to attempt to establish that they have an "office or place of
business" within the United States and hence secure the very different
tax treatment accorded taxpayers . . . [having an office or place of
business therein]. Since such corporations and individuals engage in
no other economic activities in the United States, they cannot be said to
be engaged in trade or business within the United States.
It appears to your committee to be in the interests of good
administration to establish but one test . . . in ascertaining the
classification of foreign entities, namely, whether or not it is engaged in
trade or business within the United States. Such amendment narrows
sharply the field of uncertainty arising in such cases and removes a
possible avenue of tax avoidance to large foreign, corporate and other
holders of domestic securities.
249
As a result of this amendment, for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1941,250 net basis taxation applied only to taxpayers that conducted a
trade or business within the United States. On the other hand, if the
taxpayer did conduct a trade or business within the U.S., the force of
attraction principle continued to apply. Thus, its U.S. source passive
income became eligible for net basis taxation and the tax benefits of taking
deductions. Minimal qualification as conducting a trade or business within
the U.S. could be a significant tax benefit and became even more important
to foreign taxpayers than it was before the 1942 legislation.
The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966251 changed this tax planning
landscape. It replaced the force of attraction principle with a regime in
which net basis taxation applies to income only to the extent that it is
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States. 25 2 For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1966,253
U.S. source passive income is drawn into net basis taxation only if there is
a factually based connection between the investment income and the
249. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1942), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAW 1953-1939 1877 (1954).
See also J.S. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAW, at
1877-88 (reprinting S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36 (1942)).
250. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-753, ch. 619, § 101, 56 Stat. 798, 802.
251. Pub. L. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966).
252, Pub. L. 89-809, §§ 103(a), 104(b), 80 Stat. 1539, 1547-50 & 1555-57 (1966). See also Pub. L.
89-809, § 102(d), 80 Stat. 1539, 1544-47 (1966) (adopting I.R.C. § 864(c) definition of effectively
connected income).
253. Pub. L. 89-809, §§ 102(e), 103(n)(1), 104(n), 80 Stat. 1539, 1547, 1555, 1563 (1966).
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taxpayer's conduct of a trade or business within the United States.254 After
1966, qualification as conducting a trade or business within the U.S. no
longer had the potential to bring the significant tax benefits that it had for
the previous generation.
Thus, there was a crucial thirty-one-year period, from 1936 through
1966, in which minimal qualification as conducting a trade or business
within the U.S. served to convert the gross basis taxation of all passive
investment income into frequently valuable net basis taxation.255 Courts
and the I.R.S. may very well have been concerned about what they
perceived as manipulation of this standard to gain a tax windfall. It is
crucial to note here that the perceived windfall arose from the interaction of
the trade or business standard with the force of attraction principle. The
two principles applied integrally, and therefore the interpretation of the
former is also simultaneously the interpretation of the latter.
Courts might well have decided to take it upon themselves to fix this
problem. Assertions of a minimum quantum of U.S. activity, even when
not necessary to resolve the actual cases presented, may have seemed
desirable to serve the prophylactic purpose of deterring bad faith attempts
to gain the benefit of using the force of attraction principle as a means of
applying net basis taxation to passive investment income. Among reported
decisions treating taxable years in the crucial period of 1936 through 1966,
only two delve at all into what role an inquiry into trade or business within
the U.S. serves. Notably, both of these use the Revenue Act of 1942 and
committee reports accompanying it to conclude that the test prevents
foreign taxpayers from gaining inappropriate access to deductions against
investment income. 6
After 1966, there no longer was any need to police the trade or
business standard as a means of limiting access to net basis taxation for
passive investment income. At this late date, no one can assert with any
authority how these courts would have interpreted the "trade or business
within the U.S." standard if Congress had adopted the effectively
connected income rules in 1936 at the same time that it eliminated the
privilege of electing net basis taxation for passive investment income. One
can say, however, that assertions in dicta of a minimum quantitative
threshold are the product of the joint interpretation of the "trade or business
within the U.S." standard and the force of attraction principle in a regime in
which net basis taxation was no longer to be elective for passive investment
income.
254 I.R.C. §§ 864(c), 871(b), 882 (2008).
255. See, eg., Amalgamated Dental Co. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 19 (1946); Scottish Am Inv. Co. v.
Comni'r, 12 T.C. 49 (1949); Linen Thread Co, 14 T.C. at 725; Cont'l Trading, 16 T.C.M (CCH) at
724.
256. Cont7 Trading, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) at 724; Scottish Am., 12 T.C. at 49.
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The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 crucially amended the
statutory landscape. Decisions for taxable years from 1936 through 1966
interpreted the prior statutory landscape. As previously observed, it is
axiomatic that a court has only the authority to decide "the particular
dispute which is before it ... [and] everything ... in an opinion, is to be
read with primary reference to the particular dispute.. . .. 27 The pre-1967
statutory landscape was integral to those decisions. Its passing means that,
even if the pertinent assertions weren't dicta, stare decisis certainly would
not apply to have the prior-law cases control the interpretation of the post-
1966 statutory terrain.
An objection to this line of reasoning bears anticipation. The Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966 did not adopt a comprehensive definition of
what it means to "conduct a trade or business within the United States." It
did make some minor amendments to the guidance that Code does provide
on the meaning of that term 258 but those amendments did not address the
core meaning of the term or refer to a quantitative threshold. The
amendment on which this line of reasoning depends was the adoption of
the "effectively connected" concept, thereby repealing the application of
the force of attraction principle in the vast majority of cases. While the two
pieces of the statutory landscape may be closely related, on what authority
can the amendment of one affect the interpretation of the other? There are
two responses to this question.
The first response is that it has happened before. Consider the case of
depreciable useful life as a predicate for the depreciability of tangible
assets. The traditional understanding of the depreciation allowance was
that taxpayers were permitted to deduct depreciation allowances only if
they were able to establish assets' depreciable useful lives 9.2 " That
principle arose as an interpretation of language in Section 167(a) that
Congress has not in any manner amended. Nevertheless the 1981 adoption
of ACRS in the form of Sectionl68 26" did rework the depreciation regime
in a manner that made continued adherence to the depreciable-useful-life
standard unjustifiable.
The depreciable-useful-life standard came into existence at a time
when cost recovery periods were tied to actual depreciable lives. ACRS
severed that connection, establishing arbitrary relatively short recovery
periods for all tangible assets. Congress prescribed five-year cost recovery
for all tangible personalty not assigned to some other category.26' Further,
257. LLEWELLYN, supra note 177, at 42-43 (emphasis omitted).
258. Pub. L. 89-809, § 102(d)(2), 80 Stat. 1539, 1544-45 (1966).
259. See Associated Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C. v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 38, 39-40 (6th Cir.
1985); Hawkins v. Comm'r, 713 F.2d 347, 353-54 (8th Cir. 1983).
260. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 203 (1981).
261. Under existing law, the pertinent catch-all category is seven-year cost recovery. See I.R.C. §
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Congress set all salvage values to zero, thereby eliminating the mechanism
that ensured the non-depreciability of assets that tend to appreciate rather
than to exhaust themselves over predictable useful lives. The depreciable-
useful-life standard was inconsistent with the new statutory environment
Congress had created, and the courts wisely set it aside.262 In the same
manner, the "trade or business within the U.S." language was affected
significantly by Congressional amendment of other Code language with
which it interacts.
This in turn leads to a second justification for this line of reasoning.
Although the assertions in dicta of a minimum quantitative threshold
purport to be interpretations of the "trade or business within the U.S."
standard, they are better understood as interpretations of the interaction of
that standard and the force of attraction principle.263 They interacted in a
manner that was perceived as creating a potential for abuse. The
quantitative threshold responded to that interaction. Once that interaction
was ended, the justification for the interpretation also ended. In fact, the
object of interpretation-the interaction-ceased to exist, and with it the
basis of the interpretations also ceased to exist.
A diligent search for decisions applying to taxable years beginning
after 1966 has not produced any cases that both refer to a minimum
quantitative threshold and in which that standard was necessary to the
resolution of the factual scenario presented. That is, the diligent search has
found no post-1966 cases rejecting Proposition 3 in which the rejection
was necessary to resolve the factual questions presented. In fact, it has
found only two such authorities even asserting a dependence on an analysis
of regularity, continuity, and considerableness of U.S. activity. Neither of
these asserts any particular justification for so doing, and in neither was
that standard a necessary minimum condition for the actual disposition of
factual scenario under consideration. 2' This should not be surprising.
Congress eliminated whatever perceived need there was for a minimum
quantitative threshold.
168(e)(3)(c) (2008).
262. See, e.g., Simon v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 247, 263 (1994), aff'd, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); Liddle
v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 285, 290 (1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995). See also Anthony P. Polito,
Fiddlers on the Tax: Depreciation ofAntique Instruments Invites Reexamination of Broader Tax Policy,
13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 87 (1996).
263. This essential interaction is easy to overlook because the Code had no explicit reference to the
force of attraction principle. Its existence had to be inferred from the structure of the provisions
imposing net basis taxation on all U.S. source income of a foreign taxpayer engaged in a trade or
business within the United States. See. e.g., Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. 74-740, ch. 690, §§ 211, 231,
49 Stat. 1648, 1714-15, 1717 (1935-36).
264. See Perez v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1988); Rev. Rul. 73-522, 1973-2 C.B. 226.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The mission of this Article has been the interpretive clarification of
what it means to conduct a trade or business within the United States. In the
age of globalization and electronic commerce, it may well be that
significant modifications to the existing standard might be warranted. As a
matter of policy, some of the existing thresholds to U.S. net basis taxation
may even have outlived their usefulness. 65 Nevertheless, no consensus
has yet emerged around any policy alternatives, and it is far from clear
whether any such proposals represents superior policy to existing law. This
Article has sought to facilitate the discussion of the policy issue by
establishing an interpretive baseline; bringing interpretive clarity to the
existing threshold to U.S. net basis taxation.
The key analytical step in achieving that clarity was to disentangle that
inquiry into two distinct inquiries:
, Is the foreign taxpayer engaged in a trade or business?
* Is the conduct of the trade or business "within" the United States?
The resulting set of interpretive propositions create a clearer framework for
addressing live questions under the Code. In concluding this interpretive
essay, a few last words about the crucial role of Proposition 3 are in order.
In Proposition 3, this Article asserts that, notwithstanding references
to the contrary in judicial opinions and revenue rulings, a foreign
taxpayer's U.S. activities need not be regular, continuous, and considerable
to bring a foreign trade or business into the United States. Congress
eliminated the one plausible justification for interpreting the Code to
require such a minimum quantitative threshold, and even before that
legislative action one is hard pressed to find any reported decisions actually
depending upon it. On the other hand, one can find numerous such
decisions depending upon qualitative grounds for excluding a foreign trade
or business from being conducted within the United States without regard
to a quantitative threshold, and also decisions in which quantitatively minor
U.S. activities did bring a foreign trade or business into the United States.
Under existing law, the most reasonable interpretive assimilation of
the pertinent authorities into a big picture is clear. The quantitative
analysis determines whether a taxpayer conducts a trade or business at all.
The analysis of whether a foreign trade or business has been brought into
the U.S. is purely qualitative.
265. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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